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NEDERLANDSTALIGE SAMENVATTING 
 
In drie verschillende papers onderzoeken we hoe belangrijk een gevoel van autonomie en 
vrijheid is voor hedonische consumptie. In een eerste paper onderzoeken we hoe een gevoel 
van autonomie in een hedonische versus utilitaire aankoopsituatie de verwachte levensduur 
van een product gaat beïnvloeden. De levensduur van een product is belangrijk, een 
consument verwacht immers dat een product voor een redelijke periode zal meegaan wanneer 
dit wordt aangekocht. Eerder onderzoek toonde aan dat consumenten de levensduur van een 
product proberen in te schatten op basis van elementen verbonden aan de marketing mix. 
Deze elementen zijn meestal niet inherent verbonden aan een product en kunnen veranderen. 
Prijs en imago van een merk kunnen hier bijvoorbeeld een belangrijke rol in spelen in. Ons 
onderzoek daarentegen gaat na in welke mate de geschatte levensduur van een product 
afhangt van de gemoedstoestand van de consument. In deze paper beargumenteren we dat de 
geschatte levensduur van een product afhangt van hoe pijnlijk het is voor de consument om 
geld uit te geven aan het product. Onze resultaten tonen aan dat hoe pijnlijker dit is, hoe 
langer men verwacht dat het product zal meegaan. Consumenten willen namelijk een hogere 
belonging voor hun ―lijden‖. Verder tonen we aan dat het pijnlijker is om te betalen wanneer 
de consument zijn/haar gevoelens van autonomie belemmerd worden. Ook blijkt  dat 
hedonische aankopen meer gevoelens van autonomie opwekken dan utilitaire. Bijgevolg 
denken consumenten dat utilitaire producten langer meegaan dan hedonische. Veel producten 
kunnen zowel voor hedonische als utilitaire redenen aangekocht worden. Deze eerste paper 
besluit dat de lengte van de geschatte levensduur mee bepaald zal worden door de 
aankoopmotivatie. 
De tweede paper onderzoekt hoe individuele verschillen in koopgedrag veranderen in 
situaties waarin consumenten geen of wel autonomie hebben. Eerder onderzoek toonde aan 
dat de hoeveelheid geld dat men wil uitgeven (deels) te verklaren valt door verschillende 
karaktereigenschappen. Verkwisters geven meer geld uit dan ze eigenlijk zouden mogen, 
omdat ze minder of geen pijn ervaren wanneer ze geld uitgeven. Gierigaards daarentegen 
gaan veel vlugger pijn ervaren wanneer ze geld uitgeven. Deze persoonlijkheidskenmerken 
zijn belangrijk en verklaren gedrag in veel verschillende situaties. In de tweede paper gaan wij 
echter na of verkwisters wel atijd meer geld uitgeven dan gierigaards. Ons onderzoek toont 
aan dat verkwisters stoppen met geld uitgeven wanneer hun gevoel van persoonlijk controle 
wordt belemmerd. Drie verschillende studies onderzoeken dit fenoneem en tonen 
 xii 
 
herhaaldelijk aan dat verkwisters niet langer verschillen van gierigaards wanneer ze geen 
controle meer ervaren omdat dat hun gevoelens van autonomie reduceert. Gierigaards 
gedragen zich niet anders wanneer ze wel of geen autonomie ervaren in een aankoopsituatie.  
In een derde paper onderzoeken we hoe religie gevoelens van autonomie kan beïnvloeden 
en er voor zorgt dat mensen minder geld willen uitgeven aan hedonische producten. Eerder 
onderzoek toonde reeds aan dat religie gedrag op twee manieren kan beïnvloeden. Religie kan 
er enerzijds voor zorgen dat mensen bepaalde plezierige producten niet langer zullen kopen 
omwille van een bezorgdheid voor de meningen van anderen. Anderzijds kan religie er ook 
voor zorgen dat een product minder wenselijk wordt en mensen daarom het product niet 
langer willen. We hebben deze invloeden in drie verschillende studies getest. In een eerste 
studie hebben we secundaire data over consumentenkredieten en religiositeit vergeleken. 
Eerder onderzoek toonde reeds aan dat consumenten vooral consumentenkredieten aangaan 
voor hedonsiche aankopen. Onze analyses tonen aan dat religieuze mensen minder 
consumentenkredieten aangaan. In twee vervolgstudies hebben we dit effect gerepliceerd. 
Deze studies tonen aan dat religie er voor kan zorgen dat consumenten gevoeliger worden 
voor de goedkeuring van anderen wat een plezierig product minder plezierig maakt.  
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ENGLISH SUMMARY 
 
Across three papers we investigate how important feelings of autonomy are for (hedonic) 
consumption. In the first paper, we investigate how (the absence) of feelings of autonomy in a 
hedonic (versus utilitarian) purchase situation affect the expected lifetime of a product. The 
lifetime of a product is important, but unknown at the moment of purchase. Earlier research 
argues that consumers will try to infer this from external signals, our research proposes that 
consumers also draw on internal states to infer product lifetime. In particular, we argue that 
consumers infer product lifetime from the pain of paying. In addition, we propose that pain of 
paying is exacerbated when consumers experience a lack of autonomy in their purchases. 
Finally, we suggest that consumers more readily experience autonomy for hedonic than 
utilitarian purchases, resulting in a longer perceived longevity for utilitarian products than for 
hedonic ones. Analysis of real market data on secondhand cars and the results of three 
experimental studies confirm our propositions. The results suggest that the mental 
categorization of a purchase as utilitarian rather than hedonic has consequences for the 
purchase of longevity-related services, such as extended services or maintenance contracts. 
The second paper investigates how chronic differences in spending behavior interact with 
(the lack) of autonomy. It has been shown that individual differences in spending behavior 
predict over- and under spending. Spendthrifts spend more than they ideally should, tightwads 
spend less than they ideally prefer because of a chronic (in)sensitivity to the pain of paying. 
Despite the reliability of these personality traits in predicting numerous spending behaviors, 
we suggest that these dispositions are not univocally related to spending behavior. In the 
current paper, we argue that spendthrifts occasionally act like tightwads when their sense of 
personal control is threatened. We manipulated personal control in three different ways 
(through third party interference, confrontation with a practical problem, and, sold out 
products). All our studies demonstrated that spendthrifts‘ willingness to spend dropped to 
similar (or lower) levels as (than) tightwads‘ when experiencing a threat to personal control. 
Reduced feelings of autonomy mediated spendthrifts‘ decreased willingness to spend when 
their personal control was threatened. 
The third paper studies how reminders of religion affect feelings of autonomy and 
therefore curtails the willingness to spend money on hedonic (but not utilitarian) products. 
Previous research has shown that religions either adjust behavior because of intrinsically 
compelling arguments or because of a fear of approval based pressures. We tested how these 
two different forms of behavioral regulation intervene with pleasurable consumption. We 
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tested our hypotheses across three different studies. In a first study we matched secondary 
data on religiosity and credit card indebtedness across the United States. Analysis of this data 
yielded that the state level average credit card debt per borrower could be explained by the 
state level average religiosity. Credit cards are more easily used to buy hedonic products. 
Hence, the results of the first study are a first indication of religions‘ influence on hedonic 
consumption. We replicated these findings in two experimental settings and found that 
reminders of religion could curtail the willingness to spend money on hedonic products for 
two different reasons. If the hedonic products were considered as minor sinful, the 
respondents refrained from spending because of a concern with approval based pressures. 
When the hedonic products were considered as major sinful, reminders of religion caused to 
intrinsically devaluate them. 
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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION 
1. A FEW WORDS ON PLEASURABLE CONSUMPTION 
edonists believe that pleasure is the primary and utter most important goal to achieve 
in life. Virtually every sane person values pleasure. Nevertheless, need for pleasure 
appears to be a difficult urge to satisfy. When feeling hungry, the rational strategy to 
follow would be eating something. When feeling poor, the rational solution would be the 
acquisition of money. Yet, when feeling deprived of pleasure the purchase of hedonic 
products does not logically lead to the experience of pleasure. The hedonic paradox states that 
pleasure is a subjective experience that may be difficult to pursuit. It is possible to buy 
products, but impossible to buy pleasure. When having a need for pleasure it is not enough to 
buy a so-called hedonic product in order to satisfy that need. The acquisition of hedonic 
products is rather viewed as a gratuitous way to achieve pleasure.  
Imagine Tess, a girl who likes to have fun. Lately, she was not feeling so happy and 
planned to do something about it. She planned to take up cycling as a hobby in order to have 
more fun in her leisure time. Accordingly, she bought a bike to execute her hobby. Theory on 
hedonic consumption would argue that the bike is considered to be a hedonic product, because 
she bought the bike to have fun. However, purchasing a bike does not guarantee that her 
desires will be satisfied. The bike could allow Tess to have fun, on the condition that the bike 
is actually able to satisfy her wishes. An important condition for making wishes come true is 
the experience of autonomy, or the freedom to act as one wants. 
A first goal of this dissertation is to scrutinize the importance of feelings of autonomy for 
(hedonic) consumption. People experience autonomy when they are able to exert causal 
influence in a given (purchase) situation and express their desires. Unfortunately, the capacity 
to do so could be hampered in a variety of ways. Bad luck (e.g., out of stock alternatives) or 
third party interference (e.g., sales people) may become obstacles and limit consumers‘ sense 
of freedom. Furthermore, social norms and values prescribe what (not) to do and form the 
moral guidance of good conduct. Social norms and values confine choice alternatives which 
could be detrimental for the expression of desires. Consumers are not always able to spend 
money on the things they personally value the most. Sometimes, consumers could even be 
forced to spend money without really wanting it (e.g., to resolve a practical problem). It is 
clear that all these situations may affect feelings of autonomy. The goal of the current 
H 
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dissertation is to investigate how (a lack of) feelings of autonomy affects hedonic 
consumption in a variety of settings.  
The hedonic paradox further argues that pleasure is a subjective experience. Tess can for 
example experience a lot of fun with her bike but that does not imply that somebody else will 
achieve similar levels of happiness with it. Some conditions have to be met in order to have 
fun with a product, but individual differences are also relevant. Research on consumer 
behavior repetitively has shown that some people are unable to indulge themselves because of 
justification issues. Such people might be less likely to respond to their desires and 
accordingly may benefit less from feelings of autonomy. The second goal of my dissertation 
is to investigate which individuals are more (or less) likely to respond to feelings of 
autonomy. 
Throughout this dissertation we aim to investigate the importance of autonomy for 
hedonic consumption. Autonomy enables the expression of subjective desires and fantasies, 
and could therefore imbue a product with subjective meaning and affect its perception. The 
third goal of my dissertation is to investigate how feelings of autonomy are likely to alter the 
perception of a product. Having versus lacking autonomy enables or disables the expression 
of desires and hence could illicit affective reactions. We aim to investigate how such an 
altered affective state(s) could change the perception of a product. 
In this introductory part we sketched some complexities related to hedonic consumption. 
These questions will form the guideline of this dissertation. We aim to scrutinize each of these 
problems and will try to understand some of the complexities associated with the hedonic 
paradox. But before digging into this matter, we will discuss what hedonic consumption 
actually is. 
2. DEFINING HEDONIC CONSUMPTION 
The idea that pleasure is important in life could be traced back to the work of Aristotle. 
The word ‗hedonism‘ comes from the ancient Greek for ‗pleasure‘. Aristotle recognized the 
importance of happiness and understood that external goods may help achieving it (Feldman 
2002). Since the emergence of consumer research as a separate discipline in the mid-20
th
 
century, scientific research started to focus on the empirical study of enjoyment related 
consumption, which gave birth to more coherent theories. Besides the emergence of 
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systematic theories, several different paradigms to study hedonic consumption emerged. Each 
approach with it its own merits and weaknesses.  
 A milestone in the research on hedonic consumption is the seminal work by Hirschman 
and Holbrook (1982). Hirschman and Holbrook were among the first to combine earlier 
insights on emotive responses, motivation research and product symbolism to advocate 
systematic research on hedonic consumption. According to them, hedonic consumption 
comprised those facets of consumer behavior that relate to the multisensory, fantasy and 
emotive aspects of one‘s experience with products. Multisensory implies that all senses can be 
involved and pleased. Hirschman and Holbrook (1982) argue that hedonic consumption 
encompasses a subjective experience of sensorial perceptions. Such experiences arise because 
consumers mentally construct a pleasurable reality around a product. The idea that mental 
imageries play an important role in hedonic consumption takes a central stand in their theory. 
Feelings of autonomy are important for the realization of inner wishes, desires and 
fantasies because it enables them. Autonomy encompasses those situations that allow 
consumers to express their inner wants, without any kind of demands to act in a certain way. 
Imagine for instance a situation in which you plan to buy a desirable product. Once at the 
store your desired alternative is no longer available. Or imagine a situation in which 
salespeople use high-pressure techniques to sell their products. Such situations limit your 
autonomy and possibilities to express your inner wants, and could therefore hamper the 
pleasurable experience as initially imagined or fantasized.  
The idea that hedonic experiences are tied to desires and imaginations incited a vast 
amount of researchers to discriminate products based on their capacity to evoke such 
experiences (e.g., Babin, Darden, and Griffin 1994; Childers et al. 2001; Voss, Spangenberg, 
and Grohmann 2003). These psychometric studies aim to identify pleasurable products, but 
also try to identify the conceptual antipode: utilitarian products. Strahilevitz and Myers (1998) 
define the difference clearly. Hedonic consumption is pleasure oriented consumption and 
encompasses something fun, experiential, and perhaps even ‗decadent‘. Hedonic and luxury 
consumption are closely related to one another. Utilitarian products stand for the opposite. 
Utilitarian consumption is goal-oriented consumption; these products are bought to carry out 
necessary functions. Dhar and Wertenbroch (2000) define hedonic consumption as 
experiential as it reflects desires and evokes fun, pleasure, and excitement whereas utilitarian 
consumption is more practical and instrumental. Research on the differences between hedonic 
and utilitarian consumption frequently relies on a product-based approach (e.g., Chandon 
2010; Ferraro, Shiv and Bettman 2005; Thomas, Desai, and Seenivasan, 2011; Wertenbroch, 
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1998). Very often, this kind of research requires respondents to choose between a hedonic or 
utilitarian alternative. One major advantage of such product-based approach is that it allows to 
study the process of making trade-offs‘ between what is fun and what is practical. However, a 
product-based approach is not flawless.  
There is reason to believe that a product-based approach is not able to fully grasp the 
differences between hedonic versus utilitarian consumption. A product-based approach 
construes consumption at a more general level and assumes that the so-called hedonic 
(utilitarian) products are only bought for hedonic (utilitarian) purposes. However, products 
often possess both hedonic and utilitarian attributes. For example, laundry detergents may be 
prototypically considered as practical and functional because of its cleaning abilities but can 
also be chosen for its‘ performance on an olfactory, hedonic dimension. Similarly, it is fun to 
drive a convertible, but considerations regarding utilitarian attributes (e.g., fuel consumption) 
could be important as well. Besides neglecting the existence of multiple kinds of attributes, a 
product-based approach also ignores the importance of the situation (Alba and Williams 
2013). For example, relative to a bottle of wine, a cellphone may be interpreted as utilitarian. 
Nonetheless, the phone may incidentally become a hedonic product when using it to play a 
game.  
It is clear that a product-based approach is not always the best solution in order to fully 
grasp the relevant effects. Studying purchase motivations instead of purchase behavior could 
help. A motivation-based approach studies the reasons why consumers buy a product, which 
is not taken into account by a product-based approach. The activation of hedonic versus 
utilitarian purchase goals and motivations allows to comprehend when a particular product 
will be used for hedonic or utilitarian purposes (Chernev 2004) or when specific types of 
attributes will be considered (Alba and Williams 2013). Motivations and goals direct 
consumers‘ attention (Kunda 1990) and could also change the perception of a particular 
product.  
3. HEDONIC VERSUS UTILITARIAN MINDSETS 
Hedonic versus utilitarian motivations steer how a product is perceived, but these 
motivations also seem to map onto independent modes of product evaluation (Dhar and 
Wertenbroch 2000; Botti and McGill 2011; Pham 1998). Hedonic purchases are affectively 
driven, and aim to achieve short-term goals. Utilitarian purchases are cognitively driven, and 
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aim to achieve longer-term goals. Interestingly, a motivation-based approach considers the 
mental construction of products as hedonic (or utilitarian) as essential to the consumption 
experience. Pleasure is a side-product of consumption, which is connected to fantasies and 
desires. Studying the hedonic and/or utilitarian motivation instead of a product-based 
approach should offer a more detailed picture of what these modes of consumption really 
encompass. Because a great deal of hedonic consumption occurs between the ears, it remains 
invisible and therefore is a potential fertile field of research. Pleasurable things have an 
underlying reality or true nature that one cannot observe directly, and it is this hidden nature 
that really matters (Bloom 2011). The idea that purchase motivations are important to 
comprehend hedonic versus utilitarian consumption is rooted in theories of motivated 
cognition (Kunda 1990; Balcetis and Dunning 2006; Proffitt, Creem, and Zosh 2001; Yang, 
Dixon, and Proffitt 1999). These theories argue that motivations bias perception by affecting 
strategies for accessing, constructing and evaluating beliefs. Motivations affect how 
information is selected and processed which affects the perception of a product. Aside from 
selectively directing attention, purchase motivations could also bias the perception of the 
attended attributes. Bruner and Goodman (1947) tested how desirability affects the perception 
of a product‘s size. Their research demonstrated that the size of objects (coins) is estimated 
bigger when the object was more desirable (poor kids instead of rich kids). More recent 
research also demonstrated that desirable high status products are assumed to be bigger 
(Dubois, Rucker, and Galinsky 2012).  
Obviously, motivations and goals color several aspects of the perceived world. However, 
consumers are not always able to perceive or attend everything. Sometimes, they have to 
make some assumptions about products especially when planning to buy something. For 
example, several quality-related attributes are often unobservable and unknown before the 
product is owned or bought. In such situations, consumers have to guess how the product will 
score. Traditional research argues that consumers tend to rely on external cues to guess the 
quality of a product (Kirmani and Rao 2000). These external cues often refer to elements of 
the marketing-mix: e.g., price, brand name … Despite the eligibility of this idea, current 
insights on how motivation affects processing and perception of products suggests that 
consumers‘ perception of the unknown attributes could also be affected by purchase 
motivations. The estimation of unknown information or unobservable attributes may also be 
contingent upon internal cues related to the purchase goal (instead of only relying on external 
cues). Buying products for pleasure or for practical purposes presumably activates some 
expectations and assumptions that may color ex ante estimations. Intriguingly, the same 
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product can be bought for hedonic or utilitarian purposes. Hence, unobservable attributes of 
the same product could be estimated differently when having a hedonic versus utilitarian 
purchase motivation. 
4. THE PERCEIVED PRICE OF PLEASURE 
Earlier research demonstrated that the price that is paid for a product drives the perception 
of a product. Price is frequently regarded as a viable indication of quality: more expensive 
products are assumed to offer higher quality (e.g., Kardes et al., 2004; Kirmani and Rao, 
2000; Levin & Johnson, 1984). At the same time, the perception of the resources needed to 
procure a product is also purchase-goal dependent. Wakefield and Inman (2003) were one of 
the first to investigate consumers‘ motivational price-sensitivity. In general, their studies 
reveal that pleasurable consumption is more price-inelastic because consumers are less 
concerned with the price of fun. For example, in one of their studies they showed that 
consumers were less price-sensitive when buying pizzas for hedonic instead of utilitarian 
purposes. Utilitarian consumers turned out to be more concerned with usefulness and were 
less price-inelastic, meaning that higher prices reduced their spending. Wakefield and Inman 
(2003) studied purchase intentions of similar products under different purchase motivations. 
Their research confirms that purchase goals alter price perceptions. In addition, other research 
also demonstrated that (non-)monetary promotions are more (less) important for utilitarian 
(hedonic) purchases (Park and Mowen 2007; Chandon, Wansink, and Laurent 2000). This 
further supports the idea that utilitarian shopping motivations activate price-sensitivity.  
The idea that price is interpreted differently according to the purchase motivation could be 
at stake with rational theory. Classic economic theory argues that purchase decisions depend 
on the rational comparison of costs and benefits. The objective amount of benefits does not 
change when you buy the same product for different reasons. However, such rational 
comparisons are not frequently made and opportunity costs are not always spontaneously 
considered (Frederick et al., 2009). Instead, consumers seem to rely on the emotions that the 
prospect of spending elicits (Prelec and Loewenstein 1998). Spending is deterred when one 
expects too much negative emotions or pain in response to spending. Emotions are a viable 
source of information (Pham, 2004; Schwarz and Clore, 1996) and the emotions that 
consumers experience in the prospect of spending are likely to color the perception of a 
product.  
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Confirmatory to this proposition is Prelec & Loewenstein's (1998) idea that the pleasure 
derived from a product is contingent upon the pain associated with its payment. Logically, the 
costs incurred for a product reduces the total utility that could be derived from the product. 
However, costs and spent resources have shown to be malleable and are subject to situation 
dependent interpretations (Prelec and Loewenstein 1998). First, consumers seem to enjoy 
products that are paid as if they were free, increasing the pleasure associated with the product. 
Down payments increase the pain of payment and thus reduce the pleasure associated with a 
product (Prelec and Loewenstein 1998). Second, the degree to which the transfer of resources 
is coupled to the actual payment of a product affects the interpretation of the costs. For 
example, paying with larger denominations (Raghubir and Srivastava 2009) and with cash 
instead of credit card (Raghubir and Srivastava 2008) has shown to be more unpleasant 
because it increases the salience of transferring actual amounts of money. Bottom-line, there 
is some variation possible in the interpretation of the resources paid for a product and this 
may affect the (expected) benefits. 
Summing up, we already mentioned that (hedonic versus utilitarian) purchase motivations 
affect the perception a product. Similar products, bought for hedonic versus utilitarian reasons 
are differently perceived. We also argued that purchase motivations alter the affective 
interpretation of incurred costs, and that product related benefits are a function of how the 
payments are perceived. Taking all these considerations into account, it seems convincible 
that the perception of a product is dependent upon the purchase motivation because the 
incurred costs are differently interpreted. The (emotional) interpretation of the price could 
thus serve as a mediating process of quality perceptions. Consequently, the same price may 
evoke different quality expectations because it could evoke different affective reactions. As 
this relation has not been closely examined, we aim to clarify how the motivation to buy a 
product and the transfer of resources could be related to the evaluation of a product. 
Unraveling how these motivations and perceptions are related to each other should offer new 
insights in how consumers construe information about unknown characteristics of products. 
Up to now, existing research assumed that consumers infer unknown information from 
observable attributes related to the marketing mix elements. If purchase motivation affects the 
interpretation of the price and therefore the perception of a product, we advance knowledge 
on this topic by showing that consumers also infer information from internal cues related to 
the purchase goal. 
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5. INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES  
We argued that how consumers feel about paying for a product is a function of 
motivational goal adherence. However, the interpretation of prices also differs along 
personality traits (Rick, Cryder, and Loewenstein 2008; Lastovicka et al. 1999). Clearly, 
tightwads encounter more difficulties to part from their money than spendthrifts. The so-
called spendthrifts are less sensitive to the pain of paying leading them to spend more money. 
Tightwads on the other hand are more sensitive to negative affective reactions in the prospect 
of spending, which limits their spending behavior. Research on spending behavior 
predominantly has corroborated the existence and consequences of these personality traits 
(Frederick et al. 2009; Haws and Poynor 2008; Lynch et al. 2010).  
As spendthrifts find it less difficult to spend money, they more easily engage in impulsive 
purchase behavior (Rick, Cryder, and Loewenstein 2008). Impulsive purchases occur in 
response to pleasurable temptations (Rook 1987). Spending differences between tightwads 
and spendthrifts could be most notable in the field of pleasurable consumption. Pleasurable 
consumption has been associated with freedom and autonomy (Botti and McGill 2011). In 
addition, freedom and autonomy constitute an important part of impulsive consumption. 
Impulsive purchases occur unintentionally and unplanned (Baumeister 2002) and mirror a 
free, unreflective desire to buy without thoughtful considerations (Vohs and Faber 2007). 
Situational feelings of autonomy could thus be a key driver for spendthrifts‘ spending habits. 
Yet, the determinative role of autonomy for spendthrifts (versus tightwads) has not been 
investigated.  
Previous research showed that spending differences between tightwads and spendthrifts 
could temporarily vanish. For example, paying with credit card instead of cash (Raghubir and 
Srivastava 2008) or with small instead of large denominations (Raghubir and Srivastava, 
2009) makes the transfer of money less salient and causes tightwads to spend more, reducing 
the spending gap. However, no research has investigated if spendthrifts ever refrain from 
spending. As argued, there is reason to believe that feelings of autonomy could be important 
for spendthrifts. Feelings of autonomy could be a psychological prerequisite for spendthrifts 
to start spending. Investigating this is potentially important to fully grasp spendthrifts‘ 
behavior. Understanding spendthrifts spending behavior is theoretically relevant, but is also of 
social significance. Empirical research yielded that spendthrifts are responsible for the 
majority of credit card debt (Rick, Cryder, and Loewenstein 2008). Credit card debt and the 
resulting defaults pose a mental burden on the everyday lives of a significant amount of 
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people (Wilson 2013). In order to comprehend this social problem, a profound understanding 
of spendthrifts‘ spending behavior is crucial. Throughout this dissertation, we aim to advance 
knowledge on this topic by investigating the role of autonomy in spendthrifts‘ spending 
behavior.  
6. NORMS, VALUES AND AUTONOMY: THE CASE OF RELIGION 
Humans prefer to be causal agents and like to be the origin of their own behavior 
(deCharms, 1968). Yet, actions and behavior are determined by the self or external forces 
(Deci and Ryan 1985). External forces operate beyond an individual‘s control and confine the 
ability to act as a causal agent. These limitations, and therefore the opportunity to act freely, 
are contingent upon various situational factors (Botti and McGill 2011; Deci and Ryan 1985). 
Several external forces can be determinative for behavior. For instance, third parties can limit 
individual freedom by directing one‘s conduct (Chen and Sengupta 2014), e.g., a trainer 
enforcing a running schedule. Fate or bad luck can also be determinative for one‘s actions and 
conduct (Rotter 1966), e.g., a sudden car breakdown limits your transportation opportunities. 
At a more general level, societal norms and values prescribe what is (not) allowed and (not) 
supposed to do (Durkheim 1897), e.g., cultural norms prohibit polygamy. In this way, societal 
norms and values are able to restrict freedom of conduct and autonomy. As norms and values 
are frequently viewed as a feature of society, the scope of consequences is broad. 
Norms and values affect autonomy, but their comprehensiveness differs from one society 
to another. Some societies offer more freedom for individuals to act autonomously than 
others. For instance, Japanese society is characterized by less autonomy than the United States 
(Berry 2002). Within country differences also exist. Survey research revealed that citizens of 
Illinois generally experience more autonomy than inhabitants of Alabama (Hock 2004). 
Curiously, a report on credit card delinquency (Wilson 2013) revealed that credit card debt 
occurs more frequently in the U.S. compared to Japan. In addition, Alabamians carry more 
credit card debt than Illinoisans. Credit card debt has been used as an indicator of impulsive 
consumption (e.g., Haws, Bearden, and Nenkov, 2011; Thomas et al., 2011). Impulsive 
consumption and the resulting credit card debt could thus be a society specific phenomenon. It 
is plausible that broader societal characteristics are important to fully grasp the underpinnings 
of impulsive consumption and the resulting credit card indebtedness. 
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Historically, religion has shown to be a source of norms that regulate behavior and 
therefore could restrict people‘s sense of freedom (Durkheim 1912). Religions provide a 
collective consciousness and encompass moral forces that discriminate between what should 
(not) be done. As religion imposes rules, it could limit consumers‘ sense of freedom and 
autonomy. The influential force of religion could especially be relevant for impulsive 
purchase behavior. Impulsive purchase behavior involves the urge to buy something due to 
the sudden activation of hedonic goals (Rook 1987). Impulsive purchase behavior typically 
encompasses a conflict between temporary desires and longer term benchmarks of behavior 
(Hoch and Loewenstein 1991). Immediate pleasure and gratification are sometimes in conflict 
with longer term norms and values. Religion is known to be a source of such ideals, values, 
morals and social expectations. Indeed, previous research yielded a correlational link between 
several kinds of impulsive behavior and religiosity. However, no causal link or mechanism 
has been documented yet. We aim to shed a light on this issue by investigating religion‘s 
causal influence on pleasurable consumption. 
7. DISSERTATION OUTLINE 
The hedonic paradox argues that pleasure is considered to be a side-product of 
consumption that arises under the right conditions. In the introduction we have set three goals 
to unravel some of the complexities associated with the hedonic paradox. The overall goal is 
to gain insights in what is determinative for having fun. We also aim to discover the 
importance of individual differences and will try to understand how a hedonic (versus 
utilitarian) purchase motivation affects the perception of a product. 
In the first empirical chapter called ―Pleasure for a moment, functionality for a lifetime‖, 
we investigate how a hedonic purchase motivation affects the perception of a product. We 
argue that the experience of autonomy is important in hedonic purchase situations. In this 
paper we demonstrate that the absence of autonomy is likely to evoke more negative affective 
reactions towards spending money. We further show that this exacerbated pain of paying due 
to a lack in autonomy urges consumers to anticipate more rewards under the form of a longer 
lasting product. As the experience of autonomy is tied to a hedonic purchase motivation, we 
show that a longer lasting product is more important when having a utilitarian instead of 
hedonic purchase motivation. 
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In the second empirical chapter called ―On becoming frugal: threat to personal control can 
make spendthrifts act like tightwads‖ we further explore the role of autonomy by investigating 
if all consumers act similarly when having or lacking it. We manipulate autonomy by 
inducing a threat to personal control and see if tightwads and spendthrifts respond differently 
to this altered state. Our findings suggest that especially spendthrifts are responsive to 
situations in which they have versus lack autonomy. When experiencing a threat to personal 
control in a spending situation, spendthrifts‘ spending dropped and no longer differed from 
tightwads‘. Doing so, we highlight the importance of autonomy and question the stability of 
the spending gap between spendthrifts and tightwads.  
In the third empirical chapter ―How God determines what we buy‖ we further explore the 
role of autonomy on (hedonic) consumption, but from a different perspective. Social norms 
and values are likely to govern behavior and thus affect feelings of freedom and autonomy. In 
this paper we investigate how exposure to religion can affect hedonic consumption. Overall 
we demonstrate that exposure to religion can negatively affect hedonic consumption, but for 
different reasons. Contingent on the moral classification of the hedonically tempting behavior, 
people can refrain from doing it because of a concern with approval based pressures or 
because of an intrinsic devaluation of the behavior at hand.  
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CHAPTER II: PLEASURE FOR A MOMENT, FUNCTIONALITY 
FOR A LIFETIME: THE IMPACT OF AUTONOMY ON PRODUCT 
LIFETIME EXPECTANCIES 
 
uyers must often infer various unobservable product attributes at the time of purchase 
(Kirmani and Rao 2000). One of the most important unobservable attributes is the 
expected longevity of a product. While actual longevity can only be assessed ex post, 
consumers nevertheless try to estimate it ex ante, drawing on several cues to do so (Kirmani 
and Rao 2000), such as brand (Price and Dawar 2002) and warranty (Huysentruyt and Read 
2010). This article shows that product lifetime estimates are driven not only by external cues 
related to the product but also by internal cues related to the purchase goal. Specifically, we 
show that pain of paying increases longevity expectations. The belief that a product will last 
longer could serve as a mitigating response for this negative reaction to spending. Moreover, 
because perceived freedom of spending is lower for utilitarian than hedonic purchases, 
exacerbating the pain of paying, consumers expect the former to last longer than the latter. 
Paradoxically, consumers dislike spending money more on the products they need the most.  
This research contributes to two literature streams. First, we contribute to the literature on 
hedonic versus utilitarian purchase goals. Most relevant to our work is the research on 
hedonic adaptation that argues that hedonic consumption is relatively transient because most 
consumers easily adapt to enjoyment related benefits (Frederick and Loewenstein, 1999; 
Wang, Novemsky and Dhar, 2009). In addition, hedonic products are more susceptible to 
fashion trends (Grewal, Mehta, and Kardes 2004) because they have a higher emotional value 
(Hsee and Kunreuther 2000) which also makes them frail and transient. We offer an 
alternative explanation for these previous findings by linking the estimated longevity of a 
product with (the absence of) autonomy and the resulting (negative) affective reactions that 
arise during a purchase. Second, we contribute to the literature on pain of paying. Prior 
research has demonstrated individual differences in pain of paying (i.e.,, spendthrift/tightwad 
distinction;  Rick, Cryder, and Loewenstein 2008) and differences associated with payment 
means (cash vs. credit card; Raghubir and Srivastava 2008). We extend this research by 
showing that the lack of autonomy in a given purchase context also increases pain of paying.  
In addition, this research is relevant for salespeople trying to sell extended service 
contracts. The uncertainty about the longevity of a product can incite consumers to purchase 
an extended service contract. These additional warranties ensure that the product will last for 
B 
 18 
 
a given time. While these constitute only 3% to 4% of sales, they are responsible for 30% to 
40% of profit (Warranty Week 2005). This article not only explains why extended service 
contracts are more frequently bought for hedonic products (Chen, Kalra, and Sun 2009) but 
also suggests that consumers may be more likely to buy them when their purchase decision 
feels more autonomous. 
1. THE LIFETIME OF HEDONIC VERSUS UTILITARIAN PRODUCTS 
Durable goods are not everlasting, and their usable lifetime ends after a certain time. From 
a consumer perspective, the life of a product ends when the product becomes absolutely or 
relatively obsolete (Cooper 2004). Absolute obsolescence occurs when the product becomes 
broken and beyond repair due to material degradation. Relative obsolescence occurs when a 
product becomes psychologically worn out because consumers‘ subjective aesthetical taste 
evolved and the product loses its attraction. It also occurs when manufacturers launch 
technological and/or fashionable upgrades. This article focuses on obsolescence estimates for 
hedonic and utilitarian purchases. While it does not seem farfetched to predict that hedonic 
versus utilitarian purchase goals predict estimates of relative obsolescence, we suggest that 
they also predict absolute obsolescence. In other words, we suggest that consumers assume 
that hedonic products break down sooner than utilitarian ones. 
In general, hedonic products offer fun, pleasure, and excitement, while utilitarian products 
offer more practical and instrumental benefits (Hirschman and Holbrook 1982). Yet purchase 
contexts are often characterized by both utilitarian and hedonic considerations. Typical 
utilitarian products also possess hedonic attributes. For example, laundry detergents can be 
preferred for their cleaning abilities but also for their performance on a hedonic, olfactory 
dimension. Similarly, it is fun to drive a convertible, but considerations regarding utilitarian 
attributes (e.g.,, fuel consumption) are important as well. Thus, because products have both 
hedonic and utilitarian attributes, consumers‘ purchase goals determine which type of 
attributes receives attention (Chernev 2004). Approaching utilitarian versus hedonic 
consumption from a goal-based perspective allows us to understand when consumers will 
direct their attention to specific attributes (Alba and Williams 2013).  
A hedonic versus utilitarian purchase motivation not only directs the focus to goal-
relevant attributes but also entails a different kind of decision (Babin, Darden, and Griffin 
1994; Dhar and Wertenbroch 2000; Hirschman and Holbrook 1982). Hedonic decisions are 
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affectively driven and inherently satisfying. For example, the main goal of hedonically 
motivated car drivers is to experience fun trips. With such a goal, driving a car is the essence 
of the usage experience. Conversely, utilitarian considerations entail a more distant benefit 
and serve a higher-order goal. For example, for transporting goods or people, a car offers a 
practical solution. As such, driving a car is not the intended goal, but rather a required step to 
resolve a transportation problem. Thus, utilitarian purchases do not appear for their own sake 
but rather serve as an intermediary act to meet a higher-order goal, while hedonic purchases 
are more terminally motivated.  
This distinctive nature between hedonic and utilitarian purchase goals affects consumers‘ 
sense of autonomy (Botti and McGill 2011).  Ryan and Deci (2000) argue that terminally 
motivated activities increase personal causality because they offer inherent satisfaction. 
Terminally motivated activities allow individuals to determine their own conduct and 
behavior. This contrasts with instrumentally motivated activities, which do not evoke personal 
causality because the reason for making the choice originates to some extent from an external 
problem. We propose that because hedonic purchases allow consumers to individually 
determine which products they want to buy, they should be awarded with a sense of 
autonomy. In contrast, because utilitarian purchases solve an external need rather than reflect 
an internal want, they should be associated with a low sense of autonomy. We posit that the 
(lack of) autonomy accompanied with a hedonic (utilitarian) purchase goal affects consumers‘ 
perceptions of a product‘s longevity. 
2. LACK OF AUTONOMY 
A sense of autonomy and being able to act as a causal agent are essential psychological 
needs that contribute to an individual‘s well-being (Ryan and Deci 2006). A sense of 
autonomy modulates emotions by reducing negative affect (Leotti, Iyengar, and Ochsner 
2010). Failing to act as a causal agent causes depression (Mineka and Hendersen 1985) and 
mood disorders (Shapiro, Schwartz, and Astin 1996). Thus, experiencing a lack of autonomy 
in a purchase context should result in the experience of negative purchase-related emotions. 
Normatively speaking, consumers should buy a product if the benefits of ownership 
exceed the amount of future benefits that must be sacrificed to finance the product. Yet 
opportunity costs are often not spontaneously considered when spending money (Frederick et 
al. 2009). Instead, consumers rely on their negative emotions in response to the prospect of 
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spending (Rick et al., 2008). When consumers experience too much negative emotions, they 
deter spending. Neuroscience research demonstrates that this visceral reaction activates the 
insula, a region that is also triggered when experiencing physical pain (Knutson et al. 2007). 
This so-called pain of paying allows consumers to control their spending behavior (Kivetz 
1999; Prelec and Loewenstein 1998). However, sometimes consumers do not have the choice 
to deter spending. Some products are at a higher status in the hierarchy of needs and their 
purchase cannot easily be forestalled (Kivetz and Simonson 2002). We argue that the absence 
to autonomously decide to spend or not increases the pain of paying. 
Not being able to autonomously decide to spend money and the resulting experience of 
negative emotions should have consequences for consumers‘ perceptions of a product‘s 
lifetime. Negative emotional reactions trigger responses that are designed to attenuate them 
and restore a homeostatic state (Gilbert et al. 2004). These defensive responses alleviate the 
psychological impact of negative events. As pain of paying is a negative affective reaction, 
consumers could develop alleviating responses to it, such as underestimating the likelihood or 
timing of a negative event (e.g.,, early replacement of a product). Prelec and Loewenstein 
(1998) argue that pain of paying interacts with the amount of anticipated utility. In particular, 
pain of paying is buffered by the scope of future utility. Consequently, believing that a 
product lasts longer when it hurts more to pay for it could serve to alleviate the pain of 
paying.   
Believing that products last longer when their purchase causes more pain of paying is a 
defensive response that attenuates the unpleasant experience of paying. Kunda (1990) argues 
that people are sometimes motivated to believe what they want to believe and therefore rely 
on rules that support their desired conclusions. Kramer et al. (2012) find that suffering from 
by-products causes consumers to believe that they are buying better products. Inferring a 
longer lifespan from negative emotions experienced at the moment of purchase could serve as 
such an alleviating response.  
We propose that utilitarian purchases evoke more pain of paying than hedonic ones and 
therefore induce consumers to believe that they will last longer. In general, it is harder to 
control or deter spending for utilitarian purchases (Botti and McGill 2011; Dhar and 
Wertenbroch 2000; Roy and Ng 2012). As argued, the inability to regulate spending behavior 
results in more pain of paying. Subsequently, consumers should experience more pain of 
paying in utilitarian purchase contexts. Several findings lend support to this idea. For 
example, Wakefield and Inman (2003) show that consumers are more sensitive to the amount 
of money they spend on utilitarian than hedonic products. Monetary promotions are also more 
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important in driving sales for utilitarian products (Chandon, Wansink, and Laurent 2000; Park 
and Mowen 2007). Because utilitarian purchases evoke more pain of paying by reducing 
consumers‘ sense of autonomy, we hypothesize that consumers believe that utilitarian 
products last longer than hedonic ones (see figure 1 for an overview of our hypotheses). 
 
Figure 1. Conceptual model 
 
 
3. STUDY OVERVIEW 
We test our theory in four studies. In study 1, we examine the demand price in a real 
secondhand car market and find that hedonic cars devalue faster than utilitarian cars. This 
suggests that the estimated longevity of hedonic cars is shorter. In study 2, we show that a 
utilitarian purchase goal evokes more pain of paying, which in turn increases a product‘s 
estimated longevity. For the final two studies, we establish a causal chain analysis in which 
we separately manipulate each step of the explanatory mechanism (Spencer, Zanna, and Fong 
2005). In study 3, we manipulate the perceived autonomy associated with a purchase decision 
and find that the lack of autonomy increases consumers‘ pain of paying. Study 4 manipulates 
pain of paying directly and shows that it leads to higher longevity estimates. 
4. STUDY 1: SECONDHAND CAR MARKET 
Consumers mentally decrease the value of a product over its estimated lifetime (Chu and 
Liao 2010; Okada 2001). The shorter the product lifetime, the steeper is the rate of 
depreciation. In this study, we draw on this connection between depreciation and estimated 
product lifetime to test whether hedonic products have a shorter estimated longevity than 
utilitarian ones. We obtained data from a large European website of secondhand cars 
(www.autoscout24.com) and examined the evolution of the demand prices of hedonic versus 
utilitarian cars. We hypothesize that the rate of depreciation is steeper for hedonic cars, in line 
with our expectation that they have a shorter estimated longevity. 
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Table 1. Overview of the cars 
 
We pretested the models to ensure that each pair contained one predominantly hedonic 
and one predominantly utilitarian model. To pretest the cars, the respondents (European 
sample, n = 60) first read a general description and saw pictures of either the hedonic or the 
utilitarian cars. Subsequently, we defined the difference between hedonic and utilitarian cars 
as follows: ―People buy hedonic cars because they offer fun, pleasure and enjoyment. 
Utilitarian cars offer functional, instrumental and practical benefits.‖ The respondents then 
rated the models on their perceived hedonic (1 = very hedonic, 7 = very utilitarian) and fun (1 
= very little fun, 7 = very much fun) dimensions. They rated the assumed hedonic cars as 
more hedonic (Mhedonic = 2.56 vs. Mutilitarian = 5.20; F(1, 59) = 88.11, p < .001) and as more fun 
to drive (Mhedonic = 5.37 vs. Mutilitarian = 4.67; F(1, 59) = 13.64, p < .001). In addition, the pairs 
of cars differed sufficiently within each brand on both dimensions. 
After selecting the subset of cars, we obtained information on the different models by 
using the scraping extension offered by Google. In particular, we inventoried the price, age, 
and mileage for each car available on the website that belonged to the selected set. We use 
demand price of the cars as an indicator of value. In total, we gathered information on 1285 
cars. We did not include cars older than 15 years in our sample because the older a car, the 
more unique and scarce a particular model becomes. Therefore, collectors‘ value increases, 
and prices may rise again with increasing age. Because we do not aim to analyze the 
secondhand market for relatively old cars, we excluded them from the sample. 
4.1 Results 
We predicted the demand price of the cars through multivariate regression. Table 2 gives 
a descriptive overview of the variables in the model. 
 
 
 
Make Hedonic Model Utilitarian Model 
Volkswagen Eos: sports car with a retractable hardtop Transporter: light commercial vehicle 
Mazda MX: lightweight two-seater roadster Mazda 2: three- or five-door hatchback or sedan 
Peugeot RCZ: sports coupé 5008: compact multipurpose vehicle 
Mercedes-Benz SLK: roadster with a retractable hardtop Vito: van for cargo or passengers 
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics 
 
We tested our predictions in two models (see table 3). In the first model, we predicted the 
demand price of the car by the car‘s age, car type (hedonic or utilitarian), mileage, and brands. 
Because age and mileage are highly correlated (r = 0.67, p < .001), we first assessed 
multicollinearity by examining the variance inflation factors (VIFs; Hair et al. 2006).The 
VIFs ranged from 1.30 to 2.85. Given that the highest VIF is less than the standard cutoff of 5 
(Hair et al. 2006), multicollinearity appears not to be an issue.  
The first model explains 78% of the variance in demand price of the secondhand cars. It 
shows that the price of the secondhand cars drops with increasing age and mileage. In general, 
the hedonic cars cost more than the utilitarian ones. In addition, brand accounts for some of 
the variance in price.  
In the second model, we tested whether hedonic cars devalue faster than utilitarian ones. 
We examined this by adding an interaction effect between car age and car type (see figure 2). 
Our second model explains 79% of the variance in price and replicates the findings of our first 
model. More important, the interaction between car age and car type is significant. In 
particular, the negative relationship between age and price is more pronounced for the 
hedonic cars. This result provides support for our hypothesis that hedonic cars devalue faster 
than utilitarian ones.  
 
 
 
 
    Mean    SD 
  Frequency 
(%) VIF 
Price (euros) 14822.17 7556.48   
Mileage (KM) 81020.25 63462.07  2.27 
Car's age (years) 5.20 3.82  2.86 
Type    1.30 
  Utilitarian (ref. cat.)   672 (52%)  
  Hedonic   613 (48%)  
Make     
  Peugeot (ref. cat.)   317 (25%)  
  Mercedes-Benz   491 (38%) 2.27 
  Mazda   234 (18%) 1.77 
  Volkswagen    243 (19%) 1.62 
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Table 3. Predicting price 
 
Figure 2. Type of car × Age of the car predicting price 
 
NOTE. - Slopes are calculated at mean mileage (KM = 81020.25) and for reference make (Peugeot) 
 
 
 
Model 1 Model 2 
 Coeff.          SE p Coeff. SE P 
Mileage -0.03 0.01 < .001 -0.04 0.01 < .001 
Car‘s age -1301.98 43.37 < .001 -998.52 62.55 < .001 
Hedonic car  5127.94 223.42 < .001 6837.69 338.68 < .001 
  Make (ref. Peugeot)       
Mercedes-Benz  4403.68 303.74 < .001 4170.77 300.81 < .001 
Volkswagen 1664.95   317.93 < .001 1502.53 313.66 < .001 
Mazda -3460.03 336.99 < .001 -3732.53 333.921 < .001 
Car's age × Hedonic    -376.56 56.76 < .001 
Constant 20506.71 225.49 <.001 19852.48 242.74 <. 001 
       
 R² = .78 
F(6, 1278 ) = 779.09, p < .001  
R² = .79 
F(7, 1277) = 693.56, p < .001 
NOTE.—All coefficients are unstandardized. 
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4.2 Discussion 
Consumers mentally depreciate the initial purchase price of a product during ownership; 
the depreciation rate is related to estimated longevity, such that products with a shorter 
estimated longevity mentally devalue faster. We hypothesized that hedonic products would 
have a shorter longevity and tested this using observed depreciation in a secondhand car 
market. In support of our hypothesis, the price of hedonic cars drops faster than that of 
utilitarian ones, suggesting a longer longevity for the latter than for the former. Indeed, 
because consumers believe that hedonic cars last for a shorter time, they are willing to sell 
these vehicles for a smaller portion of the initial purchase price, compared with utilitarian 
cars. 
Although study 1 provides support for our main hypothesis with real market data, it has 
several shortcomings. First, we did not actually measure the perceived longevity of the cars. 
Instead, we relied on the rate of change in demand price as a proxy measure. Second, we only 
had information about the demand price of the cars. Thus, we do not know how the selling 
processes further evolved: how much the sellers actually received or if they were able to sell 
the car at all. Third, the hedonic and utilitarian cars we selected may have differed in other 
aspects that could cause a difference in demand price. While our use of multiple pairs 
mitigates this possibility somewhat, we cannot rule it out entirely. The next three studies 
therefore use a lab experimental approach to replicate our initial findings and to further test 
our hypotheses. 
5. STUDY 2: TEST OF THE FULL MODEL 
The goal of study 2 is twofold. First, we want to test the proposed mechanism that 
utilitarian purchases reduce consumers‘ sense of autonomy, thereby evoking more pain of 
paying and, as a result, increasing perceived longevity of a product. Second, we propose that 
hedonic products not only become obsolete faster in an absolute sense but also are more likely 
to become obsolete faster in a relative sense because they are subject to fashionable upgrades, 
which also reduce their longevity (Grewal et al. 2004). To rule out that any observed 
difference in estimated longevity involves relative rather than absolute obsolescence, we 
control for susceptibility to trends. 
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5.1 Method  
Ninety-six respondents (Mage = 33 years, 64 women) from an online panel of a European 
university participated in study 2. The respondents were instructed to imagine that they were 
buying a bike for either hedonic or utilitarian purposes. In the hedonic condition, respondents 
imagined that they were buying a bike to execute their hobby. In the utilitarian condition, they 
imagined that they were buying a bike to commute to their job. Buying a bike to cycle as a 
hobby is a terminally motivated purchase because riding is the goal. Buying a bike to 
commute is an intermediate purchase because the bike serves as a transportation device. In the 
hedonic condition, the respondents read the following instructions (translated version): 
 
Recently you decided to take up cycling as a hobby. You always enjoyed making bike 
trips. You plan to make at least one enjoying trip every week. However, before you 
can start your new hobby you have to buy a bike. You decide to use this bike only to 
practice your hobby. The local bike dealer offers multiple models with different levels 
of quality. You decide to buy a midrange model of a well-known brand. Finally you 
can start practicing your hobby. You experience a lot of fun during your bike trips. 
You really like to ride with your bike. 
 
In the utilitarian condition, the respondents read the following text (translated version): 
 
Recently you started a new job. Your job is located in your hometown, but the place is 
difficult to reach by car or public transportation. You decide to go to work by bike. 
The only limitation that you encounter is that you do not own a bike. So, you decide to 
go to the local bike dealer. He offers multiple models with different levels of quality. 
You decide to buy a midrange model of a well-known brand. Finally you can get to 
work efficiently. 
 
After reading the instructions, the respondents were asked to answer several questions. 
First, we measured longevity by asking, ―How long do you think you could use the bike 
before having to dispose it?‖ (1 = very short, 9 = very long) and ―When do you think you will 
need to replace the bike?‖ (1 = very late, 9 = very soon). This measure captures two sub 
decisions that affect the longevity of a durable good (Roster and Richins 2009). We reverse-
coded the second item and averaged it with the first to obtain a measure of estimated product 
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life (α = .68). Subsequently, we asked how much pain of paying the respondents would 
experience when paying for the bike (1 = not at all painful, 7 = very painful). To measure 
sense of autonomy, we asked if they would experience the purchase as something they wanted 
to do or as something they needed to do (1 = something I need to do, 7 = something I want to 
do). To control for susceptibility to fashionable product enhancements, we asked whether they 
would replace the bike when the manufacturer releases a new model (1 = definitely won‘t, 7 = 
definitely will). To check our manipulation, we offered a definition of hedonic versus 
utilitarian purchases and asked the respondents to rate the purchase (1 = very hedonic, 7 = 
very utilitarian) and to indicate how much fun they anticipated having with the bike (1 = very 
little fun, 7 = a lot of fun). In addition, we asked them how they felt (1 = very bad, 7 = very 
good), to control for the effect of mood on their longevity predictions (Schwarz and Clore 
1996). Last, we measured affinity with the product (1 = definitely enjoy biking, 7 = definitely 
do not enjoy biking). 
5.2 Results and Discussion 
The manipulation was effective. The respondents rated buying a bike for leisure purposes 
as more hedonic than buying a bike to commute (Mutilitarian = 5.49 vs. Mhedonic = 3.19; F(1, 95) 
= 71.43, p < .001) and as more pleasurable (Mutilitarian = 4.80 vs. Mhedonic = 5.38; F(1, 95) = 
7.26, p < .01). Across the conditions, all respondents equally liked to ride a bicycle (Mutilitarian 
= 2.82 vs. Mhedonic = 2.96; F(1, 95) = 0.22, p = .64), and no differences in mood occurred 
(Mutilitarian = 5.08 vs. Mhedonic = 5.15; F(1, 95) = 0.10, p = .75). More important, a utilitarian 
purchase goal increased the perceived longevity (Mutilitarian = 7.21 vs. Mhedonic = 6.73; F(1, 95) 
= 4.42, p < .05).  
In accordance with the PROCESS mediation procedure (Preacher and Hayes 2008), we 
conducted different regression models (10,000 bootstrap resamples) to test the mediating 
processes in our model (see table 4). To begin, we tested whether differences in purchase 
goals affected the respondents‘ sense of autonomy. Indeed, buying a bike to commute 
restricted the sense of autonomy (Mutilitarian = 4.24 vs. Mhedonic = 5.49; F(1, 95) = 17.75, p < 
.001). As predicted, utilitarian purchases evoke less autonomy than hedonic ones.  
Furthermore, an analysis of variance reveals that utilitarian purchases also evoke more 
pain of paying (Mutilitarian = 3.55 vs. Mhedonic = 3.00; F(1, 95) = 4.62, p < .05). A linear 
regression analysis predicting pain of paying by purchase goal and sense of autonomy 
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indicates that more autonomy reduces pain of paying. The partial correlation between 
purchase goal and pain of paying is no longer significant. This suggests that a higher (lower) 
sense of autonomy for hedonic (utilitarian) purchases explains a decrease (increase) in pain of 
paying. Accordingly, the indirect effect of autonomy is significant (95% CI: LL –.94; UL –
.34; Sobel test p < .001).  
Before testing the next step in the mediation process, we wanted to assess the influence of 
purchase goal on susceptibility to trends and to test whether the latter is related to pain of 
paying and/or sense of autonomy. The respondents indicated that they would more easily 
replace the hedonic bike upon the release of a fashionable upgrade (Mutilitarian = 2.04 vs. 
Mhedonic = 2.77; F(1, 95) = 10.55, p < .01). A regression analysis predicting susceptibility to 
trends by purchase goal, sense of autonomy, and pain of paying yields only significant results 
for purchase goal. The last step in the combined sequential and parallel mediation analysis is 
to test whether exacerbated pain of paying, due to a lack of autonomy, increases consumers‘ 
longevity estimates, regardless of a higher susceptibility to trends. The PROCESS mediation 
procedure by Preacher and Hayes (2008) does not allow testing models that combine 
sequential and parallel mediation. Hence, we used AMOS to estimate the relevant paths. Our 
model fitted the data well (χ²/df =0.74, p=0.57, RMSEA=0.00, CFI=1.00). A regression 
analysis predicting longevity by purchase goal, autonomy, pain of paying, and susceptibility 
to trends yields significant effects of pain of paying and susceptibility to trends. Moreover, 
pain of paying increases the longevity of a product, regardless of a reduction in the product‘s 
longevity, because of a higher susceptibility to trends. We report all direct effects in a path 
diagram (see figure 2).  
 
Figure 2. Path Diagram 
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Inspection of the indirect effects reveals that a utilitarian purchase goal reduces sense of 
autonomy, which increases pain of paying and therefore increases the longevity (95% CI: LL 
= –.35; UL = –.06). The indirect effect of purchase goal on estimated product life through 
sense of autonomy only (95% CI: LL = –.35; UL = .13) or through pain of paying only (95% 
CI: LL = –.14; UL = .12) is not significant. In addition, we compared our original model with 
a model in which we reversed the order of the two mediators. This analysis reveals that the 
Akaike information criterion (AIC) is better for the original path model (AICoriginal = 24.95; 
AICalternative = 41.19). Pain of paying has no indirect effect through sense of autonomy on 
longevity. Consequently, our analysis reveals that the increase in longevity for utilitarian 
purchases is explained by a decrease in autonomy, which increases pain of paying. Last, the 
indirect effect of purchase goal through susceptibility to trends is also significant (95% CI: LL 
= –.58; UL = –.05). This means that hedonic products are more susceptible to trends, which 
also reduces their longevity. Importantly, the two reported mechanisms do not intervene with 
each other. 
In summary, study 2 demonstrates that two separate mechanisms explain why consumers 
believe that utilitarian products last longer than hedonic ones. First, a utilitarian purchase goal 
reduces the sense of autonomy and thereby increases pain of paying, which in turn extends the 
longevity of a product. Second, though not the focus of this article, we find that the longevity 
of hedonic products is shorter because these kinds of products are more susceptible to 
fashionable upgrades. In study 2, we rely heavily on traditional mediation analyses; however, 
this type of analysis exhibits some major weaknesses (Spencer et al. 2005). First, the 
relationship between the mediating variables and the dependent variable is in essence 
correlational, and causation is only assumed. Because we did not manipulate sense of 
autonomy or pain of paying, we did not directly establish their causal roles in longevity 
estimates. Second, psychological processes are often difficult to measure because doing so 
may intervene with the process. Consequently, it is often difficult to argue that the proposed 
psychological process is measured correctly. 
The drawbacks of a mediation design are easy to counter by executing a causal chain 
analysis (Spencer et al. 2005). A causal chain analysis comprises a series of experiments in 
which the mediating processes are manipulated separately. By manipulating the underlying 
processes, causal inferences can be made with more confidence. This also solves the 
measurement problem. To confirm that the proposed psychological processes lie at the heart 
of the differences in longevity for hedonic versus utilitarian purchases, we present a causal 
chain analysis in our next two studies. 
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6. STUDY 3: MANIPULATING AUTONOMY 
In study 2, we provided process evidence through a sequential mediation analysis. In 
study 3, we zoom in on one aspect of this mediation sequence and manipulate sense of 
autonomy, the first proposed mediator in the process. Doing so allows us to examine the 
causal role of the sense of autonomy in pain of paying and longevity estimates. To eliminate 
any confounds with type of purchase goal (e.g.,, susceptibility to trends), we keep the goal 
constant. 
6.1 Method 
We recruited 68 respondents (Mage = 34 years, 51 women) from an online panel of a 
European university. All respondents were asked to imagine that they enjoy taking pictures in 
their spare time, prefer to do so with up-to-date equipment, and were buying a new camera. 
We used the same two measures for longevity as in study 2 (α = .68). The respondents 
imagined that they were buying a new camera either because they wanted it or because their 
previous one was stolen. Theft happens beyond one‘s control and therefore should force 
consumers to spend money on new equipment to be able to execute their hobby. A pretest 
confirmed that replacement due to theft reduces the sense of autonomy because it forces 
people to spend money they otherwise would not (F(1, 54) = 10.26, p < .01). The respondents 
in the voluntary (obligatory) spending condition read the following instructions (translated 
version): 
 
Try to imagine that you enjoy taking pictures and photography is your hobby. In order 
to execute your hobby, you like to have proper equipment. You are aware of recent 
developments and like to know what the market offers. Now and then you sell your 
old equipment in order to buy new equipment. Recently you decided to buy a new 
camera. (Recently you had to buy a new camera because your previous one was 
stolen.) The local dealer offers a range of models. You decide to buy the Obscura, a 
recent model of a well-known brand. The camera offers a lot of fun while executing 
your hobby.  
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In addition to estimated duration of product life, we asked the respondents how painful it 
would be to pay for the camera (1 = not at all painful, 7 = very painful) and measured two 
potential confounds: mood (1 = very bad, 7 = very good) and affinity with the product (1 = 
definitely like taking pictures, 7 = definitely do not like taking pictures). Furthermore, we 
provided a definition of hedonic versus utilitarian products and asked the respondents to 
identify the purchase goal (1 = very hedonic; 7 = very utilitarian). We wanted to keep 
purchase goal constant across the conditions to eliminate any potential confounds. 
6.2 Results and Discussion 
Respondents from both conditions (Mtheft = 2.60 vs. Mwant = 2.57) equally liked to take 
pictures (F(1, 67) = 0.04, p = .84), reported a similar mood (Mtheft = 4.91 vs. Mwant = 5.26; 
F(1, 67) = 1.42, p = .24), and rated the purchase goal as rather hedonic (Mtheft = 2.88 vs. Mwant 
= 2.71; F(1, 67) = 0.25, p = .62). Replacing a stolen camera, instead of voluntarily replacing 
it, urges consumers to believe that the new camera will last longer (Mtheft = 6.55 vs. Mwant = 
5.88; F(1, 67) = 5.76, p < .05). The reduction of autonomy thus leads to an increase in 
longevity. Replacing the stolen camera also causes more pain of paying (Mtheft = 5.61 vs. 
Mwant = 3.00; F(1, 67) = 62.47, p < .001).  
To test whether negative affective reactions to spending (i.e.,, pain of paying) account for 
an increase in longevity, we conducted a mediation analysis (Preacher and Hayes 2008). This 
analysis, with 10,000 bootstrap resamples, reveals a significant Sobel test (p < .05). When we 
control for pain of paying, the direct effect of sense of autonomy disappears (t(68) = –0.32, p 
= .75), and pain of paying turns out to be a better predictor (t(68) = 2.14, p < .05). Pain of 
paying fully mediates the total effect of sense of autonomy on longevity: the direct effect was 
not significant (95% CI: LL = –.85; UL = .64), but the indirect effect was (95% CI: LL = –
1.23; UL = –.01). 
In general, study 3 offers evidence that lack of autonomy increases pain of paying and, 
consequently, increases the longevity of a product. Study 3 contributes by manipulating rather 
than merely measuring autonomy; doing so better establishes the causal role of perceived 
autonomy in the proposed mechanism. Moreover, study 3 demonstrates that pain of paying 
differs not only by purchase goal. Indeed, we show that pain of paying is affected by a sense 
of autonomy, which differs across several purchase contexts. In this study, replacement for 
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external reasons (i.e.,, theft) decreases consumers‘ sense of autonomy in the purchase and 
even causes a hedonic purchase to be viewed as less autonomous.  
Although study 3 establishes the causal role of lack of autonomy, we did not manipulate 
pain of paying. Consequently, we infer its causal role from correlational evidence. Study 4 
aims to provide stronger evidence for the causal role of pain of paying in longevity estimates.  
7. STUDY 4: MANIPULATING PAIN OF PAYING 
In study 4, we strive to find more definite support for the idea that negative affective 
reactions to spending increases consumers‘ estimates of a product‘s longevity. To do so, we 
directly manipulate pain of paying. Prior research has shown that negative affective reactions 
to spending differ across different methods of payment (Prelec and Loewenstein 1998). In 
particular, the more the transfer of money becomes salient, the more consumers experience 
pain of paying. For example, the transfer of money is less salient when paying with a credit 
card than when paying with cash because the link between the purchase decision and the 
actual parting of money is less evident (Raghubir and Srivastava 2008). Because paying with 
cash causes more pain of paying, we propose that this method of payment should also 
increase consumers‘ perceptions of longevity. 
7.1 Method 
In total, 144 U.S. residents (Mage = 29 years, 53 women) were recruited through Amazon 
Mechanical Turk. All respondents received $.10 for their participation. In the first part of the 
study, the respondents were instructed to imagine that they were buying a new jacket. To 
manipulate pain of paying, they either paid in cash or used a credit card. To distract their 
attention away from the method of payment, we framed it as a choice task. In the cash 
condition, the respondents had to select different denominations ($10 and $20 bills). In the 
credit card condition, they chose one of two credit cards with which to pay (MasterCard or 
Visa).  
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The respondents in the cash (credit card) condition read the following instructions: 
 
You have decided to go to the local mall to buy a new jacket. After browsing different 
stores you find a jacket that fits. The jacket costs $89.00. Next to the store there is an 
ATM. You decide to withdraw cash, so you can pay for the jacket. (You have two 
credit cards with you. Which card will you use to buy the jacket?) 
 
After the respondents read the scenario, we measured estimated product life (α = .76). To 
control for price–quality inferences and mood, we asked them if $89.00 would be an 
appropriate price for a jacket (1 = very inappropriate, 7 = very appropriate) and how they felt 
at the moment (1 = very bad, 7 = very good). 
7.2 Results and Discussion 
Neither price perceptions (Mcash = 4.44 vs. Mcredit card = 4.44; F(1, 143) = 0.00, p = .99) nor 
mood (Mcash = 6.55 vs. Mcredit card = 5.88; F(1, 143) = 2.39, p = .12) differed across conditions. 
However, the respondents in the cash condition estimated that the jacket would last longer 
(Mcash = 7.90 vs. Mcredit card = 7.24; F(1, 143) = 6.94, p < .01). Thus, using the most painful 
method of payment causes the respondents to believe that the jacket lasts longer. 
8. DISCUSSIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
The longevity of a product is an unobservable attribute at the moment of purchase. In 
general, consumers use external cues to infer unobservable product attributes (Kirmani and 
Rao 2000). This article shows that internal cues also affect inferences about product 
longevity. We show that consumers believe that a product will last longer when they 
experience more pain of paying when purchasing it. Presumably, a higher life expectancy 
compensates for the negative affect and restores a homeostatic state. Moreover, we argue that 
this pain of paying is related to the purchase goal. As utilitarian purchases are obligatory, 
instrumental steps to solve a practical problem, they are associated with little autonomy and 
with a higher pain of paying than hedonic products. Correspondingly, consumers believe that 
utilitarian products last longer than hedonic ones.  
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With study 1, we provided preliminary evidence for the hypothesis that utilitarian cars are 
expected to last longer. Analysis of real market data shows that hedonic cars devalue faster 
than utilitarian ones. In this study, the rate of depreciation served as a proxy of the cars‘ 
longevity. Furthermore, study 1 differs from the other studies because it involves goods that 
people already possess. The endowment effect (Thaler 1980) asserts that people ascribe a 
higher value to possessions, and this effect may be an important confound. An alternative 
explanation for the current findings would be if car owners systematically overvalue their 
utilitarian vehicles than their hedonic ones. Yet consumers attach more value to hedonic 
products in situations of forfeiture (Dhar and Wertenbroch 2000). Thus, it is more likely that 
the sellers of hedonic cars overvalue their vehicles. If so, hedonic cars may devalue even 
faster than assumed.  
Study 2 demonstrated evidence for our full model. We found that the respondents 
expected utilitarian bikes to last longer than hedonic ones because these bikes are associated 
with a higher pain of paying. Furthermore, sense of autonomy mediated the effect of purchase 
goal on pain of paying. Believing that a utilitarian product lasts longer may possibly alleviate 
the negative affect experienced at the moment of purchase because of a reduced sense of 
autonomy. In addition, study 2 showed that this compensatory reaction operates 
independently of fashion obsolescence. Studies 3 and 4 further corroborate the proposed 
mechanism by establishing a causal chain analysis, in which we manipulated each variable of 
the mediating process separately. 
In general, we offer additional insight into how consumers form their longevity estimates 
at the moment of purchase. Up to now, this process has not been examined. Prior research 
suggests that ex ante assessments of unobserved features (e.g.,, longevity) rely on external 
cues (Kirmani and Rao 2000). We show that an internal cue—namely, pain of paying—also 
affects such assessments. The finding that pain of paying is relevant for ex ante assessments is 
in accordance with research that documents the psychological impact of negative visceral 
reactions (Gilbert et al. 2004). We propose that prolonged estimated longevity caused by 
exacerbated pain of paying is a compensatory reaction in response to pain of paying. It is also 
a self-serving conclusion because it justifies the amount of resources spent. Research on 
motivated cognition demonstrates that people often draw self-serving conclusions to fit their 
goals (Kunda 1990). Believing that a utilitarian product lasts longer not only justifies the pain 
of paying but also is in accordance with the long-term objectives inherent to utilitarian 
purchase goals (Alba and Williams 2013).  
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However, hedonic products may be more sophisticated and have more additional options 
that could breakdown. In addition, hedonic products may be used more intense. Wear and tear 
could thus be higher for hedonic products, hence offering an alternative explanation for our 
documented effects. Yet, similar arguments are possible for utilitarian products. Wear and tear 
could also be higher for utilitarian products because these products are more frequently used 
(e.g., utilitarian bike to commute daily vs. hedonic leisure bike). Consequently additional 
research is needed to disentangle the effects of (anticipatory) wear and tear on the expected 
lifetime of a product.  
We also want to highlight the potential importance of pain of paying for the so-called 
process of hedonic adaptation. The thrill of having a new enjoyable product eventually fades 
away (Frederick and Loewenstein 1999). It could be difficult for consumers to predict the 
exact timing of this hedonic fallback, but they have some intuitive beliefs about it (Wang et 
al. 2009). Indeed, our results confirm that the anticipated utility of hedonic products is 
relatively transient. More importantly, we contribute to the literature by suggesting that pain 
of paying could be a previously unknown antecedent in understanding the process of hedonic 
adaptation. Our research shows that pain of paying urges consumers to anticipate more utility 
and therefore could slow down the rate of hedonic adaptation.  
Related to this issue are the recent findings of Besharat, Varki and Craig (forthcoming) on 
debt management. They demonstrate that consumers may want to match incurred costs with 
anticipated benefits and thus prioritize hedonic debts because hedonic products are expected 
to offer only temporarily benefits. Hence, ex ante estimates of anticipated utility could have 
ex post consequences for the experience of pain of (re)paying and debt management in 
general. At the moment of purchase, utilitarian purchases evoke more pain of paying because 
of a reduction in autonomy and subsequently increases longevity estimates. After the 
purchase, hedonic debts cause more pain of (re)paying because paying off a product that is 
expected to last for a shorter period of time makes it more difficult to match the costs and 
benefits of a product (Besharat et al. forthcoming).  
Attributing a longer life to utilitarian products because they evoke more pain of paying 
presumably is a defensive psychological reaction. Perhaps underestimating the longevity (or 
overestimating the likelihood of failure) of hedonic products is also a form of self-protective 
behavior. The breakdown of a good involves the forfeiture of one‘s possession. Situations of 
forfeiture are unpleasant and have a significant, negative emotional impact (Kahneman, 
Knetsch, and Thaler 1990). In general, individuals assign a higher probability to the 
occurrence of negative events because they want to protect themselves against decisions 
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based on an underestimate (Harris and Corner 2011; Harris, Corner, and Hahn 2009). 
Consequently, consumers should believe that products last for a shorter time than they 
actually do (Huysentruyt and Read 2010). The tendency to overestimate the occurrence of 
negative events is a function of the severity of its consequences (Harris, Corner, and Hahn 
2009). Hedonic products have a high emotional value that gives the product meaning and 
prompts attachment (Hsee and Kunreuther 2000). Thus, the forfeiture of a hedonic product is 
more painful than that of utilitarian products (Chen et al. 2009; Dhar and Wertenbroch 2000). 
As subjective probability estimates are a function of the severity of the consequences, 
consumers should ascribe higher probabilities to the breakdown of hedonic products. Indeed, 
throughout our studies we found that the longevity estimates were shorter for hedonic 
products. Consequently, underestimating the longevity of a hedonic product could also be a 
self-protective measure against misjudging the proximate breakdown of a highly valued 
hedonic product. Still, additional research is required to examine this speculation in depth. 
We argued that a biased set of cognitive processes and strategies underlies the formation 
of longevity estimates of a product. However, if consumers are worried that the product will 
not last for a significant amount of time, they can insure the product by purchasing an 
extended service contract. These insurance services are offered by manufacturers and are 
highly profitable (Warranty Week 2005). The high profit margin on extended service 
contracts suggests that these contracts are often overrated by consumers. In general, 
consumers buy them to acquire peace of mind (Hsee and Kunreuther 2000) and when they are 
risk averse (Chen et al. 2009). Our model suggests that the mental categorization of a product 
could affect the purchase of extended service contracts. In particular, categorizing a product 
as hedonic (utilitarian) could increase (decreases) the likelihood of purchasing an extended 
service contract. First, hedonic products are expected to last for a shorter time. The purchase 
of an extended service contract could increase the estimated longevity. Second, hedonic 
products cause less pain of paying. Spending additional money on optional services is more 
likely to occur when experiencing a fair level of pain of paying. Thus, retailers could 
potentially increase the sale of extended service contracts by stressing the hedonic attributes 
more than the utilitarian ones. Similarly, less painful methods of payment (e.g.,, credit card) 
could increase the likelihood of buying an extended service contract. Conversely, more 
painful methods of payment (e.g.,, cash) should decrease the likelihood of purchasing an 
extended service contract because consumers more easily believe that they already paid 
enough for the main product. 
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This research also contributes to the literature on autonomy and suggests some managerial 
implications. Research has amply demonstrated that sense of autonomy is important for an 
individual‘s well-being and that the lack of it evokes negative emotions (Ryan and Deci 2006; 
Leotti et al. 2010). Prior research acknowledges that a hedonic (utilitarian) purchase goal 
increases (reduces) consumers‘ autonomy and ability to express own preferences, which 
inflates (deflates) satisfaction (Botti and McGill 2011). We show that this lack of autonomy 
experienced in utilitarian purchase contexts also evokes more pain of paying. Anticipatory 
pain of paying inhibits spending (Rick et al. 2008). Consequently, the likelihood of 
purchasing an extended service contract should drop when consumers are not able to express 
their own values and preferences. In addition, consumers with a utilitarian purchase goal 
should be more price sensitive than hedonic shoppers.  
We argued that hedonic purchases allow consumers to express their own values and 
preferences and therefore evoke a sense of autonomy, which reduces the pain of paying. Yet 
hedonic purchases could also emanate from a force external to the self. As study 3 shows, 
consumers may buy hedonic products because of external pressures. Theft occurs beyond 
consumers own will and enforces the replacement of a (hedonic) product. Similarly, group 
values and norms (Cooper 2004) or the unexpected breakdown of a product could drive 
purchase behavior (Grewal et al. 2004). In the presence of such an external force, hedonic 
purchases acquire an enforced undertone that reduces a sense of autonomy. Thus, the presence 
or absence of external forces is associated with differences in pain of paying and longevity 
estimates within hedonic purchases. In addition to the presence or absence of external forces, 
affective reactions related to guilt could be related to the experience of pain of paying in 
hedonic purchase contexts (Rick et al. 2008). 
Hedonic purchase situations are usually seen as an opportunity to express preferences and 
desires. Spending money is thus perceived as more positive in such a situation. Utilitarian 
purchase situations are not interpreted as an opportunity, but rather as a limitation because it 
can force consumers to spend money. Hedonic versus utilitarian consumption is broad 
conceptualization that encompasses several purchase contexts with a vast array of variable 
attributes. Some other forces can also intervene. Autonomy is assumed to be connected with 
hedonic (but not utilitarian) purchase situations, but the experience of autonomy can also vary 
within these purchase contexts. The goal of our second study, was to manipulate feelings of 
autonomy. While focusing on this difference, we might have overseen or neglected the 
variance of autonomy in utilitarian situations. At worst, the manipulation of study 2 could be 
considered as a manipulation of autonomy rather than hedonic versus utilitarian. Hence, our 
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manipulation of hedonic versus utilitarian purchase contexts may not be representative for all 
hedonic versus utilitarian situations, which may impose a serious limitation on the 
generalizability of our current findings. Hedonic purchases could evoke guilt because they are 
sometimes wasteful and irresponsible. Guilt should be positively correlated with pain of 
paying (Rick et al. 2008). Guilt for hedonic purchases originates from choosing hedonic 
products (vice) over utilitarian products (virtue) in a temporal proximal setting (Kivetz and 
Simonson 2002; Kivetz and Zheng 2006; Okada 2005). The absence of a utilitarian alternative 
reduces guilt, and the absence of hedonic alternatives gives rise to feelings of missed pleasure 
and evokes regret (Kivetz and Keinan 2006). In our studies, the respondents were never 
confronted with discretionary choices in which they could opt for a hedonic or a utilitarian 
alternative. Thus, guilt likely did not affect our result, which is supported by our failure to 
find any mood differences. 
Still, the idea that guilt may also affect pain of paying and longevity estimates has some 
merit. To test this, we asked 117 U.S. residents through Amazon Mechanical Turk (Mage = 30 
years, 84 men, $.15 remuneration) to imagine that they were purchasing a new laptop to play 
games, chat, and listen to music. In the first condition, they bought the laptop but had to 
forestall the repair of their car and therefore were confronted with a practical transportation 
problem. In the other condition, there was no conflict between the hedonic purchase and a 
practical problem. Subsequently, we asked how guilty the respondents would feel (1 = 
definitely will not, 7 = definitely will) and how much pain of paying they would experience (1 
= not at all painful, 7 = very painful) and let them estimate the longevity of the laptop (see 
studies 2, 3, and 4; α = .61). Putting pleasure before the practical transportation problem was 
an effective way to manipulate guilt (Mhedonic = 2.62 vs. Mconflict = 5.47; F(1, 116) = 123.19, p 
< .001). When the respondents‘ short-term hedonic interests conflicted with their long-term 
utilitarian interests, they expected to experience more pain of paying (Mhedonic = 4.43 vs. 
Mconflict = 5.03; F(1, 116) = 5.35, p < .05) and estimated that the laptop would last longer 
(Mhedonic = 5.12 vs. Mconflict = 5.78; F(1, 116) = 8.43, p < .01). Furthermore, pain of paying 
mediates the longevity estimates (95% CI with 10,000 bootstrap resamples: LL = –.39; UL = 
–05; Sobel test: p < .05). In summary, any factor that increases pain of paying for a hedonic 
product, either an external force that reduces one‘s sense of autonomy or a conflict with a 
long-term goal that elicits guilt, should increase longevity estimates for the product involved.  
This research demonstrated that consumers infer the longevity of a product from the pain 
of paying they experience at the moment of purchase. Further research should focus on how 
consumers infer other unobservable attributes from pain of paying. For example, buyers are 
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often uncertain about the general quality of the product provided by sellers (Kirmani and Rao 
2000). Pain of paying could influence how consumers ex ante estimate unobservable quality. 
In addition, pain of paying (and reduced autonomy) could make consumers more aware that 
they are spending money, which makes them more demanding and also could affect their ex 
post evaluations.  
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CHAPTER III: ON BECOMING FRUGAL: THREAT TO PERSONAL 
CONTROL CAN MAKE SPENDTHRIFTS ACT LIKE TIGHTWADS  
 
onsumer overspending is a serious social ill (Schorr 1998). The evidence is 
staggering: Personal credit card debt has doubled in the past four years. Personal 
bankruptcies are at a historical high. Average individual spending has increased about 
30% in the last 25 years. Research has attributed some of this to the inability of some 
consumers to inhibit their spending behavior (Wilcox, Block, and Eisenstein 2011). Spending 
more than one actually possesses, and reckless spending behavior in general, has been tied to 
dispositional differences (Rick, Cryder, and Loewenstein 2008; Rick and Loewenstein 2008; 
Rick, Small, and Finkel 2011). So-called spendthrifts impulsively spend money, save less and 
are responsible for a substantial amount of credit card debt. Tightwads on the other hand, tend 
to contemplate whether to buy something or not and typically spend less (Kivetz and Keinan 
2006).  
Clearly, while personality traits can drive individual differences in spending behavior, 
prior research has established that situational factors can curb or even override their impact. 
Ironically, despite the problem of overspending, prior research has successfully demonstrated 
how to make tightwads act like spendthrifts by diminishing the pain of payment. For instance, 
paying with a credit card instead of cash (Raghubir and Srivastava 2008) or with small instead 
of large currency denominations (Raghubir and Srivastava 2009) makes the transfer of money 
less salient and causes tightwads to spend more. In addition, framing a cost as small makes it 
easier for tightwads to spend and thus reduced spending differences (Rick et al. 2008). The 
current paper attempts to understand the role of situational factors in diminishing – even 
reversing – spendthrift behavior, to identify how to get spendthrifts to act more like tightwads.  
Prior research has demonstrated that spendthrifts exhibit a unique psychology. 
Spendthrifts tend to act impulsively and are more likely than tightwads to succumb to 
transient desires (Frederick et al. 2009; Haws, Bearden, and Nenkov 2011; Haws and Poynor 
2008; Lynch et al. 2010). Acting on impulse presupposes the freedom to do so, or the absence 
of predetermined rules of conduct (Baumeister 2002; Patrick, Curtin, and Tellegen 2002; 
Vohs and Faber 2007). But how would spendthrifts react if their assumption of situational 
control is questioned or their sense of personal control threatened? Up until now, no research 
has considered the importance of personal control and the feeling of autonomy this affords 
spendthrifts as a key driver of spendthrift behavior. This is the focus of the current work. We 
C 
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aim to demonstrate that a situationally induced threat to personal control profoundly 
influences a spendthrift‘s feelings of autonomy resulting in a decreased willingness to spend 
as they typically would.  
We present a set of three studies to shed light on this issue. In study 1, we demonstrate the 
basic effect to show that a threat to personal control lowers spendthrifts‘ willingness to spend 
money on pleasurable things. In study 2, we demonstrate the role of consumption context: 
spendthrifts were less willing to spend when they were required to solve a practical problem 
than when they consumed out of their own volition. In study 3, we illustrate that reduced 
personal control diminished feelings of autonomy, which mediated the willingness to spend. 
In general, our empirical evidence supports the idea that spendthrifts‘ willingness to spend is 
hampered when personal control is threatened.  
The current findings yield several contributions. First, we contribute to the literature on 
spendthrifts (Rick et al. 2008, 2011; Rick and Loewenstein 2008) by introducing personal 
control as a moderator. By doing so, we present evidence that refutes the common assumption 
that spendthrifts always spend more than tightwads. Second, we also expand knowledge on 
how feelings of autonomy – or the lack thereof – affect (spending) behavior. Autonomy has 
been associated with a vast range of benefits (Leotti, Iyengar, and Ochsner 2010; Mineka and 
Hendersen, 1985; Ryan and Deci 2006; Shapiro, Schwartz, and Astin 1996; see Chen and 
Sengupta 2014 for a notable exception), but in our research feelings of autonomy help explain 
why spendthrifts spend, not necessarily always a good thing. Finally, our results suggest some 
important downstream consequences for spendthrifts‘ debt management and overall 
subjective well-being. First and foremost, our findings bring to mind that spendthrifts mostly 
overspend when having the freedom to choose. A possible option to reduce spendthrifts‘ 
spending could be to help them understand their own behavior. Second, overspending may 
cause financial worries, but since spendthrifts act on the basis of their desires, they tend to act 
thrifty when it comes to practical products. Economizing on instrumental consumption could 
contribute to increased experiences of everyday hassles and annoyances which is detrimental 
for subjective well-being. The optimal advice for spendthrifts is thus to limit their pleasurable 
purchases, but not to economize on practical products. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. First we review the extant literature on 
tightwads versus spendthrifts with a focus on the unique psychology underlying these traits. 
Next, we review the literature on personal control and present our arguments for how threat to 
personal control can curtail spendthrifts‘ spending tendencies. Relatedly, we propose that 
diminished feelings of autonomy mediates this effect. We present a set of three studies in 
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which personal control is manipulated in different ways to demonstrate the effect on 
spendthrift behavior. We conclude with a discussion of our findings, implications for 
marketers and policy makers and directions for future research in this domain of investigation. 
1. TIGHTWADS VERSUS SPENDTHRIFTS 
Normatively speaking, consumers should buy a product if the benefits of ownership 
outweigh all the future benefits associated with refraining from the purchase; the latter not 
only include the monetary cost but also the utility associated with the next best use of that 
cost. However, opportunity costs are not always considered spontaneously when spending 
money (Frederick et al. 2009). Instead, a substantial body of literature argues that consumers 
rely on their negative emotions in response to the prospect of spending (Prelec and 
Loewenstein 1998), or, the pain of payment. When consumers anticipate/experience negative 
emotions, spending is deterred. Neuroscience research demonstrates that such negative 
affective reactions activate the insula, a brain region which is also triggered when 
experiencing physical pain (Knutson et al. 2007). Consumers‘ spending behavior is thus 
regulated by affective reactions towards payment rather than by rational comparisons of costs 
and benefits (Kivetz 1999; Prelec and Loewenstein 1998). 
Although purchase decisions are contingent upon the pain associated with the cost, 
research has also shown that the same dollar amount can evoke different affective reactions in 
different people. In other words, sensitivity to the pain of payment is an individual difference 
that helps predict (over) spending tendencies (Rick et al. 2008). Spendthrifts are individuals 
who are less sensitive to the pain of paying leading them to spend money more easily. 
Tightwads, on the other hand, are more sensitive to the pain of payment that hampers their 
willingness to spend money.  
Accompanying the sensitivity to the pain of payment is a host of factors that underlies the 
unique psychology of spendthrifts versus tightwads. Several findings suggest that spendthrifts 
act on the assumption of autonomy and freedom from constraints, making them less likely to 
consider opportunity costs (Frederick et al. 2009). Spendthrifts do not like to plan things in 
advance (Lynch et al. 2010) and care less about longer term consequences of behavior (Haws 
and Poynor 2008). Indeed, in accordance with their tendency to act without restraint, 
spendthrifts more easily engage in impulsive purchase behavior (Rick et al. 2008) and are low 
in self–control (Haws et al. 2011). Since, impulsive purchases occur unintentionally and 
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unplanned (Baumeister 2002) they mirror a free, unreflective desire to buy without thoughtful 
considerations (Vohs and Faber 2007). Spendthrifts, unlike tightwads, are more likely to 
respond to transient desires to fulfill the pleasure of consumption, rather than consider the 
pain of payment. These findings paint a more complete picture of the psychological make-up 
of a spendthrift versus a tightwad.  
Armed with the knowledge of this unique psychology, it might therefore be possible to 
alter situational factors to shift the general tendencies of tightwads and spendthrifts. Indeed, 
previous research has done just that. Prior research has shown that by making the pain of 
payment less salient, tightwads start increasing their willingness to spend. For instance, 
framing an expense as small reduced the pain paying for tightwads and prompts their 
willingness to spend money (Rick et al. 2008). In a similar vein, paying with credit card 
instead of cash (Raghubir and Srivastava 2008) or with small instead of large denominations 
(Raghubir and Srivastava 2009) makes the transfer of money less salient, reduces the pain of 
paying and causes tightwads to spend more.  
We build on this interactionist perspective, to identify how to leverage the unique 
spendthrift psychology to get spendthrifts to act more like tightwads. Overall, there is 
substantial evidence to suggest that spendthrifts‘ unconstrained spending pattern reflects a 
tendency to behave autonomously and freely. If spendthrifts are inclined to act without 
(external) limitations, the incapacity to do so should discourage them to spend money. We 
therefore predict that a situationally induced threat to personal control could be the key to 
reducing spendthrifts‘ spending behavior. 
2. PERSONAL CONTROL AND FEELINGS OF AUTONOMY 
Personal control refers to the extent to which individuals are able to determine situational 
outcomes. When a given situation allows individuals to intentionally produce desired, or 
prevent undesired, outcomes, high personal control is experienced (Skinner, Michael, and 
Baltes 1988). On the other hand, if individuals believe that their actions do not affect 
situational outcomes, they experience low personal control (Glass and Carver 1980). Several 
external forces can interrupt and threaten individuals‘ perception of personal control (Langer 
1975). While major events such as natural disasters, horrific acts of violence or social turmoil 
curtail personal control, situationally induced threats to personal control also take place in 
more mundane settings (Chae and Zhu 2014; Cutright 2012). For instance, a disorderly office, 
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being stuck in a traffic jam, accidental product failure or the interference of salespeople, are 
all situations that can induce the perception of threat to personal control.  
Personal control is generally considered an important human need (Kelly 1955; White 
1959) and its experience offers several psychological benefits (Brandstadter and Baltes-Gotz 
1993). When individuals have a grip on the situation they become more confident (Miller 
1979), experience less negative emotions (Leotti, Iyengar, and Ochsner 2010) and believe that 
they are more competent (Langer 1975). Because personal control helps determine the 
outcome of a situation, it empowers individuals to express their own wishes and desires. 
Personal control offers the freedom to express inner desires and choose personally valued 
alternatives. This sense of freedom, referred to as subjective vitality, can make people feel 
enthusiastic, alive and psychologically energized (Chen and Sengupta 2014; Ryan and Deci 
2001; Ryan and Frederick 1997). Such energizing effects are activated when individuals are 
able to freely express their own choices, wishes and desires. This freedom of action is 
generally understood as autonomy (Deci and Ryan 1985; deCharms 1968; Ryan and Deci 
2000).  
Personal control and autonomy are conceptually distinct, but related. The ability to act 
autonomously, or to express inner desires, presupposes the possibility to determine situational 
outcomes. For example, participating in your preferred training program at the gym 
presupposes that you are personally able to determine your choice. The positive feelings of 
autonomy can be conceptualized as a byproduct of personal control, consequently threats to 
personal control impede feelings of autonomy. For example: if you are assigned (as opposed 
to being able to choose) a training program, you are not able to determine situational 
outcomes and thus the situation has threatened your sense of personal control and influenced 
your feelings of autonomy.  
Personal control is a requirement for autonomy and therefore closely related to it. Still, 
feelings of autonomy can also be experienced in low control settings. For example, Chen & 
Sengupta (2014) observed increased feelings of autonomy when being forced to do something 
bad (consumption of vices). Being forced to do something bad instead of freely choosing it 
increased feelings of autonomy because it reduced the guiltiness associated with the act. 
Although personal control and autonomy tend to be closely related to one another, some 
notable exceptions exist and it is possible to experience autonomy in low control situations. 
Similarly, high control does not always lead to the experience of autonomy. Botti, Orfali and 
Iyengar (2009) showed that people are less likely to benefit from positive psychological 
energy when having control over tragic choice alternatives. Lastly, some research suggests 
 48 
 
that the perception of control is as important as the actual experience of it (Langer 1975; Ryan 
and Deci 2000) which also implies that someone can experience autonomy without actually 
having control. 
We posit that the ability to determine situational outcomes and choose freely is especially 
important for spendthrifts. As argued above, there is reason to believe that spendthrifts‘ 
spending behavior reflects a tendency to act without restraint. Spendthrifts act on impulse and 
spontaneously give in to transient desires. This behavior is facilitated by the assumption of 
personal control and the ability to determine situational outcomes. Indeed, psychological 
independence fosters impulsive spending behavior (Zhang and Shrum 2009) and people free 
of chronic suffering are more likely to enjoy the benefits of such freedom (Ryan and 
Frederick 1997). We therefore suggest that personal control and the feelings of autonomy this 
affords is a key driver of spendthrift behavior. Consequently, we predict that situationally 
induced threat to personal control can influence spendthrifts‘ feelings of autonomy and result 
in a decreased willingness to spend. Our predictions, therefore, suggest that spendthrifts do 
not always spend more than tightwads. When personal control is threatened and spendthrifts 
are not able to express own wants, their spending behavior could resemble tightwads‘ 
spending habits. Spendthrifts could thus, paradoxically, act like tightwads. 
Tightwads‘ spending behavior on the other hand is less likely to be influenced by shifts in 
personal control. Tightwads do not exhibit a strong urge to act autonomously and respond to 
transient desires. Since tightwads tend to excessively plan and attempt to regulate their 
spending behavior (Lynch et al. 2010), choice freedom and autonomy are not important 
concerns for these individuals. In fact, since tightwads believe that money protects them 
against future uncertainties (Rose and Orr 2007), their spending behavior is disciplined 
(Lastovicka et al. 1999). Overall, previous findings suggest that tightwads are high in self-
control and therefore exhibit strictly monitored spending behavior that remains unaffected by 
situational cues related to threats in freedom to spend. 
To summarize, we hypothesize that a situationally induced threat to personal control 
should moderate spendthrifts‘ (but not tightwads‘) spending behavior and this effect is 
mediated by diminished feelings of autonomy. See figure 1 for the conceptual framework that 
guides our empirical investigation. 
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Figure 1. Conceptual framework 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3. OVERVIEW OF THE EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION 
Across three studies we manipulate situationally induced threat to personal control in 
different ways and in different contexts to test spendthrifts‘ willingness to spend money. In 
study 1, spendthrifts (but not tightwads) were less willing to spend money on a pleasurable 
activity when experts determined their purchase option instead of themselves. In study 2, we 
explore how consumption context affects the studied phenomenon. Spendthrifts exhibited a 
lower willingness to spend when forced to solve practical problem. Lastly, in study 3 
spendthrifts were again less willing to spend money when they were not able to choose 
because the alternatives were sold out. In this study we also tested our hypothesized process: 
mediation analysis establishes that the threat to personal control lowers the positive feelings 
related to autonomy, subsequently diminished spending behavior more significantly than 
when personal control and feelings of autonomy were unthreatened. 
4. STUDY 1: MODERATING ROLE OF PERSONAL CONTROL 
The goal of study 1 was to demonstrate the basic effect that when personal control is 
threatened, spendthrifts‘ willingness to spend diminishes. Since external forces of control 
often originates from social agents or fate (Langer 1975; Zuckerman et al. 1978), we 
manipulate personal control threat by imposing outcomes decided by experts. Participants 
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were therefore assigned either an outcome by experts or could personally choose one, after 
which they were asked whether they were willing to spend money on a subsequent 
pleasurable activity. 
4.1 Method 
Ninety US-respondents (Mage = 33 years, 49 female) were recruited through Amazon 
Mechanical Turk and each were compensated ($.20). Males and females were evenly 
distributes across conditions (χ²(1, 89) = .20, p = .66). All respondents were asked to imagine 
that they always enjoyed exercising and that they are subscribed to a local gym (cf., Botti and 
McGill 2011). They further imagined that they wanted to intensify their training sessions by 
joining one of four training camps the gym organized during the weekend. All respondents 
read the same scenario: 
 
Imagine that you have always enjoyed exercising. Exercising is an inherently 
motivated and self-rewarding activity for you as it is pleasurable and exciting. 
Although you exercise regularly and are subscribed to the local gym, your training 
sessions are not as intense as they used to be.  
  
Recently your gym has decided to organize a training camp during the weekend. The 
goal of the training camp is to offer a challenging and sensational training program. 
You have decided to join the training camp because you find it very pleasurable to 
exercise and it allows you to intensify your personal training program.  
 
In total your gym offers four different training programs during that weekend: 
  
1. Military Boot Camp: A mix of long-distance running, short-distance swimming,  
  and circuit training 
 
2. Iron Men Training Camp: A mix of short distance running, long-distance  
  swimming, and endurance-building exercises 
  
3. Power Biathlon Training Camp: A mix of long-distance biking, short-distance  
  swimming, and strength training 
  
4. Master Cardio Camp: A mix of long-distance biking, repeated uphill sprints, and  
  cardiovascular exercise 
  
 
After reading the scenario and being informed about the different training programs, 
respondents were either told that they could choose one of the four training programs or that 
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the staff of the gym had assigned one that matched their personal abilities. In the latter 
condition (no-choice), participants were evenly assigned to the four programs. After reading 
the scenario, we told the respondents that the gym has a Finnish sauna and asked whether they 
would be interested in paying an additional fee to visit the sauna (―Would you be willing to 
pay an additional fee to visit the Finnish sauna?‖; 1 definitely will not; 7 definitely will). As 
manipulation checks, participants were asked if they experienced the allocation of the training 
program as something they personally endorsed or as externally enforced (―I feel as if I own 
this choice of training program‖; 1 = strongly disagree; 7 = strongly agree). The tightwads-
spendthrifts scale as developed by (Rick et al. 2008) was also administered. This scale 
consists of four items (α = .75) that measure individuals‘ tendency to impulsively spend 
money. A higher score indicates a higher inclination to be a spendthrift. In order to control for 
decision involvement related issues, we also asked whether the respondents generally liked to 
exercise (1 = dislike extremely; 7 = like extremely). 
4.2 Results  
Manipulation check: The manipulation of personal control was effective. The respondents in 
the threat condition indicated that the training program choice was enforced (M = 3.02, SD = 
1.77) compared to the respondents who could choose (M = 4.72, SD = 1.38; F(1, 89) = 25.80, 
p < .001). In further support of our manipulation, the average score of the respondents in the 
low personal control condition was significantly lower than the scale‘s midpoint (3.02 vs 4; 
t(43) = -3.66, p < .001). The respondents in the high personal control condition, on average, 
scored higher than the scale‘s midpoint (4.72 vs 4; t(45) = 3.55, p < .001). In addition, there 
were no differences in decision involvement since non-choosers liked to exercise (M = 4.59, 
SD = 1.34) as much as the choosers (M = 4.87, SD = 1.52; F(1, 89) = .85, p = .36).  
 
Willingness to spend: Generally, the willingness to purchase a visit to the Finnish sauna did 
not differ when respondents were able to choose (M = 4.07, SD = 1.88) or not (M = 3.86, SD 
= 2.02; F(1, 89) = .24, p = .63). Willingness to purchase a visit to the Finnish sauna within the 
non-choosing condition did not differ as a function of the assigned training program (Mbootcamp 
= 4.25, SD = 2.34; Miron men = 4.17, SD = 2.13; Mpower biathlon= 3.33, SD = 1.73; Mmaster cardio= 
3.55, SD = 1.86: F(3, 40) = .52, p = .67). In the choice condition, the different training 
programs were equally appealing as indicated by similar choice counts (Nbootcamp = 11; Niron 
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men = 12; Npower biathlon= 14; Nmaster cardio= 9) (χ²(46) = 1.13, p = .77). The willingness to 
purchase a visit to the sauna also did not significantly across programs in the choice condition 
(Mbootcamp = 3.73, SD = 1.85; Miron men = 4.33, SD = 1.82; Mpower biathlon = 4.29, SD = 2.02; 
Mmaster cardio = 3.78, SD = 1.98) (F(3, 42) = 3.19, p = .81). 
 
Willingness to spend × spendthrift tendency: Overall, spendthrifts were more willing to spend 
money on a visit to the Finnish sauna with marginal levels of significance (r = .19, p = .08). 
More importantly, the hypothesized interaction (see graph 1) between the spendthrift-scale 
and the choice versus no-choice conditions when predicting willingness to spend money on a 
visit to the Finnish sauna was significant (F(1, 89) = 5.64, p < .05).  
 
Graph 1. Choice × Spendthrifts on willingness to purchase a visit to the sauna 
 
NOTE: the dashed horizontal line indicates the boundary of the region of significance at p < .05 (> 18.30). 
 
Contrast analysis revealed that spendthrifts were relatively more willing to spend money 
when they could participate in the training program of their choice (+ 1 SD = 1.09; t(89) = 
1.96; p < .05) while tightwads‘ willingness to spend money did not differ when they could 
choose a training program or not (– 1 SD = -.81; t(89) = -1.43; p = .16). This suggests that 
spendthrifts are more susceptible to threats to personal control than are tightwads, which 
would be consistent with the literature. Johnson-Neyman analysis shows that respondents 
scoring at least 18.30 (approximately 12% of the respondents) on the spendthrift-tightwad 
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scale were more willing to spend money on a visit to the Finnish sauna when they could 
personally choose their training program. Further inspection of the slopes confirmed that 
spendthrifts planned to spend more than tightwads when they could personally choose their 
training program (β = .19; t(89) = 2.98, p < .01). Lastly, spendthrifts‘ willingness to spend 
money on a visit to the Finnish sauna did not differ from tightwads‘ when personal control 
was threatened (i.e., when choice of training program was determined by experts; β = -.01; 
t(89) = -.22, p = .83).  
4.3 Discussion  
We hypothesized that spendthrifts would refrain from spending in situations where 
personal control was threatened. In support of our hypothesis, study 1 showed that 
spendthrifts spend more when they experience personal control and this tendency is 
diminished when personal control was threatened. Importantly, spendthrifts‘ spending did not 
differ from tightwads‘ when they could not choose, making spendthrifts act a lot like 
tightwads.  
5. STUDY 2: CONSUMPTION CONTEXT MATTERS 
The goal of study 2 was to assess how consumption contexts can threaten personal 
control, hamper spendthrifts‘ feelings of autonomy, and, decrease willingness to spend. 
Spendthrifts like to spend, especially on pleasurable things. Consequently, a situation that 
could potentially threaten spendthrifts‘ sense of personal control is the functional requirement 
to spend to solve a practical problem. Practical problems are often unforeseen, happen beyond 
an individual‘s control, and, usually give rise to utilitarian purchases that offer instrumental 
solutions (Dhar and Wertenbroch 2000). Consequently, we predict that spendthrifts, who 
typically like to act on their desires and derive pleasure from indulgence, are no more likely 
than tightwads to want to spend money in utilitarian consumption contexts compared to more 
hedonic, volitional, consumption contexts.  
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5.1 Method  
Data was collected from 186 respondents through the online panel at a large university 
(Mage = 31 years, 136 female). Males and females were evenly distributed across both 
conditions (χ²(1, 186) = 0.41, p = .52). The respondents were instructed to imagine that they 
needed transportation and had to buy a bike (utilitarian consumption), or imagined that they 
planned to buy a bike for recreational purposes (hedonic consumption). Buying a bike 
because one has to, to solve a transportation need threatens one‘s sense of personal control as 
the motivation to buy the bike does not originate from the self. Buying a bike to cycle as a 
hobby does not hamper personal control because it reflects personal want and desires. 
Consequently, decisions on the purchase of bike accessories (our key DV) would be tainted 
by the functionality (hedonicity) of the consumption context.  
 
 
In the low personal control condition, the respondents read the following text (translated 
version): 
 
Recently you started a new job. Your job is located in your hometown, but the place is 
difficult to reach by car or public transportation. The only way to get to work 
efficiently is by bicycle. However, before you can start your new job you have to buy 
a bike. You decide to buy this bike only to get you to work and back. The local bike 
dealer offers multiple models at different levels of quality. You decide to buy a 
midrange model of a well-known brand. Finally you can get to work efficiently using 
your bicycle.  
 
In the high personal control condition, the respondents read the following scenario (translated 
version): 
 
Recently you decided to take up cycling as a hobby. You have always enjoyed taking 
bike trips. You plan to take at least one enjoyable trip every week. However, before 
you can start your new hobby you have to buy a bike. You decide to buy this bike only 
for recreational purposes. The local bike dealer offers multiple models at different 
levels of quality. You decide to buy a midrange model of a well-known brand. Finally 
you can start cycling as your hobby. You have a lot of fun on your bike trips. You 
really like to ride your bike. 
 
After reading the scenario, participants had to indicate if they would be interested in 
purchasing some additional products to improve their bike rides. We asked (1 definitely will 
not; 7 definitely will) if they would buy a bicycle helmet, waterproof cycling jacket, spare 
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inner tubes, bicycle pump and reflective clothing (α = .69). To test how the respondents 
perceived the purchase, we offered definitions of utilitarian and hedonic consumption and 
asked them to rate the purchase (1 = very hedonic, 7 = very utilitarian). In addition, the 
respondents had to indicate how much fun they anticipated having with the bike (1 = very 
little fun, 7 = a lot of fun). Feelings of autonomy was measured by asking if they interpreted 
the purchase as something they wanted to do rather than something they had to do (1= 
something I totally have to do; 7 = something I totally want to do). The spendthrift-scale 
(α=.74) was administered. One might argue that negative mood, and not diminished 
autonomy, might explain spendthrifts reduced willingness to spend, so we measured baseline 
mood by asking how participants felt about making the bike accessory purchases (1 = very 
bad, 7 = very good). Finally, we asked whether they generally like riding with a bike (1 = 
definitely enjoy biking, 7 = definitely do not enjoy biking) to control for product involvement. 
5.2 Results  
Manipulation checks: First, we checked whether the manipulation was effective and tested for 
potential confounds. Indeed, buying a bicycle to commute was perceived as more utilitarian 
(M = 5.69, SD = 1.03) than buying a bicycle for a hobby (M = 2.75, SD = 1.45; F(1, 185) = 
256.59, p < .001). In addition, the respondents anticipated having more fun while performing 
their hobby (M = 5.92, SD = .62) compared to commuting (M = 4.61, SD = 1.25; F(1, 185) = 
80.22, p < .001). No differences in mood were found between respondents in the hedonic 
consumption context (M = 5.30, SD = .97) or those in the utilitarian consumption context (M 
= 5.34, SD = .99; F(1, 185) = .07, p = .79). Product involvement did not differ across both 
conditions; the respondents in the hedonic condition (M = 2.76, SD = 1.41) equally liked to 
ride with a bike as the ones in the utilitarian condition (M = 2.98, SD = 1.51; F(1, 185) = 1.00, 
p = .32).  
 
Willingness to Spend Money on Bike Accessories: Overall, the respondents that imagined 
buying the bicycle for practical purposes (commute; M = 3.60, SD = 1.22) were less willing to 
spend money on the bike accessories than respondents buying the bicycle for pleasurable 
reasons (hobby; M = 4.05, SD = 1.20; F(1, 185) = 6.51, p < .05). In general, spendthrifts did 
not exhibit a higher willingness to spend money (r = -.06, p = .44). The interaction (see graph 
2) between purchase goal and the spendthrifts-scale was significant (F(1, 185) = 6.54, p < 
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.05). Follow-up analysis of this interaction showed that spendthrifts were more willing to 
spend when buying a bicycle for their hobby relative to buying a bicycle to commute (+1 SD 
= .91; t(185) = 3.61; p < .001). No differences in willingness to spend occurred for tightwads 
in across both purchase contexts (-1SD = -.01 (t(185) = -.02; p = .98). 
 
Graph 2. Purchase goal × Spendthrifts on willingness to spend money on bike accessories 
 
NOTE: the dashed horizontal line indicates the boundary of the region of significance at p < .05 (> 14.07). 
 
Johnson-Neyman analysis showed that participants scoring at least 14.07 on the spendthrift-
scale (approximately 53% of the respondents) were less willing to spend money in the 
practical instead of the pleasurable purchase context. Lastly, spendthrifts did not significantly 
differ from tightwads when having a pleasurable purchase goal (β = .06; t(185) = 1.56, p = 
.12), but exhibited a significantly lower willingness to spend than tightwads when having the 
practical purchase goal (β = -.07; t(185) = -2.14, p < .05). 
 
Perceived Autonomy: Generally, respondents in the practical purchase condition (M = 4.24, 
SD = 1.83) experienced less feelings of autonomy than those in the pleasurable condition (M 
= 5.81, SD = 1.28; F(1, 185) = 45.35, p < .001).On average, spendthrifts did not experience 
more autonomy (r = -.12, p = .12) than tightwads. However, the hypothesized interaction 
(graph 3) between purchase motivation and the spendthrift-scale was significant (F(1, 185) = 
6.74, p < .01). Post-hoc analysis demonstrated that spendthrifts experienced less autonomy 
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than tightwads when buying the practical bike (β = -.12; t(185) = -2.75, p < .01). Spendthrifts 
and tightwads did not experience more or less autonomy in the pleasurable purchase situation 
(β = .06; t(185) = 1.11, p = .27). Moreover, spendthrifts (+1 SD = 2.95; t(185) = 6.58, p < 
.001) and tightwads (-1 SD = 0.95; t(185) = 2.92, p < .001) both experienced more autonomy 
when buying the pleasurable bike compared to the practical one. However, a Johnson-
Neyman analysis revealed that this was not case for extreme tightwads (scoring less than 
10.55 on the spendthrift-scale, approximately 15% of the respondents). Extreme tightwads did 
not experience more autonomy while purchasing the pleasurable bike.  
 
Graph 3. Purchase goal × Spendthrifts on perceived autonomy 
 
NOTE: the dashed horizontal line indicates the boundary of the region of significance at p < .05 (> 10.55). 
 
Mediation Analysis: To test whether tightwads versus spendthrifts willingness to buy across 
the pleasurable versus practical purchase context is mediated by perceived autonomy, we used 
the Preacher and Hayes (2008) macro to estimate the indirect effects (model 8). All the 
indirect effects were estimated using 10,000 bias-corrected bootstrap resamples. This analysis 
revealed a positive and significant indirect effect (β = .03) because the estimated 95% 
confidence interval did not include zero (LL = .007; UL = .065). Further inspection 
demonstrated a significant conditional indirect effect of autonomy for spendthrifts (+ 1 SD: β 
= .37; LL .125; UL .658) and tightwads (-1 SD: β = .16; LL .044; UL .363). When controlling 
for feelings of autonomy, the conditional direct effect of spendthrifts (β = .55; t(185) = 2.02, p 
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< .05) lost explanatory strength compared to the model without autonomy (β = .91; t(185) = 
3.61, p < .001). This suggests that spendthrifts‘ willingness to spend is partially mediated by 
autonomy. The conditional direct effect of tightwads was no longer significant (β = -.16; 
t(185) = -.65, p = .52).    
5.3 Discussion  
Study 2 lends support for our model by manipulating feelings of personal control by 
confronting the respondents with a practical problem versus a pleasurable goal. Spendthrifts 
were less willing to spend when confronted with the practical problem because they 
experienced less personal control which affects their feelings of autonomy. Strikingly, 
spendthrifts were even less willing to spend money than tightwads when having to solve the 
practical problem. By demonstrating that spendthrifts plan to spend less in practical than 
pleasurable purchase contexts, we corroborate our previous findings by showing that 
spendthrifts spend less in externally controlled (practical instead of pleasurable) situations. 
Study 2 also illustrated that decreased feelings of autonomy mediated the effect of personal 
control threat on willingness to spend. 
6. STUDY 3: MEDIATING ROLE OF AUTONOMY 
The goal of study 3 is twofold. First we aim to replicate our hypothesized effect in a 
purchase situation that does not allow personal choice because the alternatives are temporarily 
out of stock due to high demand. When several alternatives are no longer available, 
consumers no longer can express their preferences and thus are confronted with reduced 
control. Second, we strive to offer mediation evidence by illustrating that diminished 
autonomy explains why a lack of control decreases spendthrift‘s spending behavior. 
6.1 Method 
One hundred and thirty-four respondents (Mage = 34 years, 56 female) completed our 
online experiment through Amazon Mechanical Turk and were compensated ($.20). Males 
and females were evenly distributes across conditions (χ²(1, 133) = .99, p = .32). For this 
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experiment we instructed the respondents to imagine that they like massages and found a spa 
that offers four different types of massages. We gave a brief description of the different 
massages and asked to read it carefully in order to figure out which they would prefer. Prior 
research also used a similar massage context (Botti and McGill 2011). 
 
There were four different massages: 
 
1. Swedish Massage: A traditional European massage focusing on circulation,  
soreness, and relaxation. This may be combined with deep tissue massage when 
more pressure is needed. 
 
2. Deep Tissue Massage: Using a variety of techniques, our therapists create a highly 
therapeutic massage incorporating deep pressure to ease muscle soreness and 
tension, and rejuvenate the body. 
 
3. Deep Tissue Massage: Five Elements Massage: It combines massage with heat 
packs, healing essential oils, and herb salves to increase flexibility, decrease 
muscular tension, and detoxify the body. 
 
4. Reflexology Massage: The ancient oriental practice of pressure-point massage 
concentrates on the nerve endings and pressure points in the head, hands, and feet 
to revitalize the body and release muscle tension. 
 
After reading about the different massages the respondents were either given the opportunity 
to select one of the massages (high personal control condition) or were told that it has been 
busy at the spa and that there was only one of the four massages available (so they could not 
choose; low personal control condition). In fact, for this latter condition, we randomly 
assigned one of the four massages. All massages were assigned an equal amount of times. 
Next we told that the spa offered multiple other services (Finnish sauna, Hammam, Jacuzzi, 
Lounge area) and asked if they would be willing to spend money on it (―Would you be 
interested in paying an additional fee to make use of one of the following services?‖: 1 
Definitely not; 7 Definitely will). We averaged the willingness to spend money on these 
services (α = .76) in order to construct a general measure. To assess the feelings of autonomy 
we administered the subjective vitality scale (Ryan and Frederick 1997). This scale (α = .88) 
consist out of 7 items (e.g.,‖ At this moment, I feel alive and vital‖, ―I don‘t feel energetic 
right now‖ (r), ―Currently I feel so alive that I want to burst‖: 1 Strongly disagree; 7 Strongly 
agree) and has shown to capture feelings of situational autonomy (Chen and Sengupta 2014). 
We also offered the spendthrifts-scale (α = .69) and assessed decision involvement (―In 
general, do you like massages?‖: 1 Dislike extremely; Like Extremely). To check our 
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manipulation (α = .88) we asked whether they experienced control over the process of 
choosing the massage (―I believe that the massage reflects my own choice‖, ―I believe that I 
had a choice over which massage I could select‖, ―I felt that I had no control to decide what to 
choose‖ (r), ―I could not choose the massage because the staff assigned one to me‖: 1 
Strongly disagree; 7 Strongly agree).  
6.2 Results 
Manipulation check: The respondents who could not choose the massage of their preference 
experienced less personal control (M = 3.17, SD = 1.58) than those who could choose (M = 
6.07, SD = 0.81; F(1, 133) = 181.74, p < .001). The non-choosers scored significantly lower 
than the scale‘s midpoint (3.17 vs. 4; t(64); -4.28, p < .001), the choosers scored significantly 
higher than the scale‘s midpoint 6.07 vs. 4; t(68) 21.34, p < .001). Decision involvement was 
not a problem as the choosers (M = 5.43, SD = 1.24) were not differently involved compared 
to the non-choosers (M = 5.23, SD = 1.40; F(1, 133) = 0.80, p = .37). 
 
Willingness to spend money: The respondents that could choose a massage (M = 3.31, SD = 
1.40) did not differ in their willingness to spend money on the additional services when 
compared to the ones that could not choose a massage (M = 3.11, SD = 1.18; F(1, 133) = .79, 
p = .38). We also checked whether willingness to spend could be a function of the chosen 
massage, when the respondents could choose. The different massages were chosen about an 
equal amount of times (Nswedish massage = 18; Ndeep tissue massage = 25; Nfive elements massage= 14; 
Nreflexology massage= 12) (χ²(69) = 5.73, p = .12) and the type of massage that was chosen did not 
affect willingness to spend (Mswedish massage = 3.32, SD = 1.56; Mdeep tissue massage = 3.52, SD = 
1.36; Mfive elements massage = 3.09, SD = 1.35; Mreflexology massage = 3.12, SD = 1.43) (F(3, 65) = .36, 
p = .78). We also checked if willingness to spend differed as a function of the assigned 
massage, when the respondents were not able to choose. Here we did find a difference 
(Mswedish massage = 3.40, SD = 1.18; Mdeep tissue massage = 2.37, SD = 1.10; Mfive elements massage = 
3.54, SD = .73; Mreflexology massage = 3.24, SD = 1.29) (F(3, 61) = 3.62, p = .02). In particular, 
participants that got the Deep Tissue Massage were less willing to spend than the ones that 
were assigned the Five Elements Massage (p = .03). Yet controlling for this difference did not 
affect all subsequent analysis. 
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Willingness to spend × Spendthrift tendency: Across the conditions, spendthrifts were not 
more willing to spend money on the additional services offered by the spa (r = .13, p = .12). 
We found a significant interaction (see graph 4) between the spendthrifts-scale and the 
manipulation of personal control and thus again replicated our hypothesized effect (F(1, 133) 
= 3.79, p = .05). A closer inspection of the interaction showed that spendthrifts were less 
willing to spend money in the spa when they could not personally choose their type of 
massage (+ 1 SD = .60; t(133) = 1.88; p = .06). Tightwads‘ willingness to spend did not differ 
when being able to choose or not (-1 SD = -.28; t(133) = -.87; p = .38). Johnson-Neyman 
analysis revealed that participants at least scoring 18.34 (approximately 10% of the 
respondents) on the spendthrift-scale were more willing to spend money in the spa when they 
had personal control. Spendthrifts‘ willingness to spend was not different from tightwads‘ 
when they could not choose their massage (β = -.02; t(133) = -.38, p = .71). When spendthrifts 
experienced control over the outcomes they were more willing to spend money than tightwads 
(β = .10; t(133) = 2.40, p = .02). 
 
Graph 4. Personal control × Spendthrifts on willingness to spend 
 
NOTE: the dashed horizontal line indicates the boundary of the region of significance at p < .05 (> 18.34). 
 
Feelings of Autonomy: On average, the inability to choose the massage lowered the feelings of 
autonomy (M = 4.49, SD = 1.01) compared to being able to choose (M = 4.83, SD = .95; F(1, 
133) = 3.91, p = .05). Across the conditions, spendthrifts did not experience greater feelings 
 62 
 
of autonomy (r = .07, p = .40), but the personal control × spendthrifts interaction (see graph 5) 
was significant (F(1, 133) = 4.84, p = .03). Analysis of the contrasts showed that spendthrifts 
experienced more feelings of autonomy when they could choose the massage versus not (+1 
SD = .69; t(133) = 2.90; p < .01). Being able to choose or not did affect tightwads‘ feelings of 
autonomy (-1 SD = -.058; t(133) = -.20; p = .84). The Johnson-Neyman region of significance 
starts at 13.31 on the spendthrifts-scale (approximately 45% of the respondents). Spendthrifts 
experienced more feelings of autonomy than tightwads when they could choose (β = .06; 
t(133) = 1.98, p = .05), which was not the case when they could not choose (β = -.04; t(133) = 
-1.15, p = .25). 
 
Graph 5. Personal control × Spendthrifts on feelings of autonomy 
 
NOTE: the dashed horizontal line indicates the boundary of the region of significance at p < .05 (> 13.31). 
 
Mediation analysis: We tested if feelings of autonomy can account for spendthrifts‘ 
willingness to spend by using the Preacher and Hayes (2008) macro (model 8) and estimated 
the indirect effect of feelings of autonomy with 10,000 bootstrap resamples. This analysis 
yielded a significant indirect effect of autonomy (β = .03) as zero was not included in the 95% 
confidence interval (LL = .001; UL = .077). Further inspection showed a significant indirect 
effect of autonomy for spendthrifts (+ 1 SD: β = .19; LL .027; UL .513), the conditional direct 
effect of spendthrifts was no longer significant when controlling for autonomy (β = .41; t(133) 
= 1.26, p = .21). This evidence suggests that spendthrifts‘ willingness to spend across the 
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conditions is fully mediated by feelings of autonomy. The conditional indirect effect of 
autonomy was not significant for tightwads (- 1 SD: β = -.01; LL -.196; UL .097, nor was the 
direct effect of tightwads significant when controlling for autonomy (β = -.26; t(133) = -.85, p 
= .40). 
6.3 Discussion 
Spendthrifts were less willing to spend on additional services when a situation of strong 
demand eliminated their possibility of choosing a type of massage. These results replicate the 
findings of the previous studies and further support our conceptual model. Importantly, study 
3 also offers strong empirical evidence of the underlying process. Spendthrifts were less 
willing to spend money when experiencing a lack of control because this drained their 
feelings of autonomy.  
7. GENERAL DISCUSSION 
Spendthrifts differ from tightwads in the freedom and lack of restraint with which they 
spend. In the current paper we focus on the role of personal control and the feelings of 
autonomy this affords in driving spendthrift behavior. We demonstrate that situationally 
induced threat to personal control can diminish spendthrifts‘ feelings of autonomy and 
decrease their willingness to spend. Given the burgeoning problem of overspending, our 
research identifies a key factor that can help get spendthrifts act more like tightwads.  
With three experiments, we tested spendthrifts‘ willingness to spend money by varying 
the perception of threat to personal control across different consumption situations. In study 1 
we showed that spendthrifts were less willing to spend money in a subsequent purchase 
situation (visit to the sauna) when a third party (experts) first determined which training 
program they had to follow. Study 2 revealed that spendthrifts do not want to spend in 
consumption contexts where they are forced to solve a practical problem because it reduces 
their feelings of autonomy. Study 3 demonstrated that spendthrifts refrained from spending 
when confronted with sold out products. Products or services that are sold out limit the 
possibility to personally choose a valued alternative. Study 3 provided mediation evidence by 
showing that spendthrifts reduced willingness to spend in response to threat of control 
occurred because it drained spendthrifts‘ (but not tightwads‘) feelings of autonomy. In both 
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study 2 and study 3 spendthrifts‘ willingness to spend was mediated by feelings of autonomy. 
We relied on different measures of autonomy in these studies which is an indicator of the 
robustness of our proposed effect. 
In all our studies, Johnson-Neyman follow-up of the significant interactions show that 
spendthrifts are affected by threat of personal control, but tightwads are not. The scale score at 
which a significant difference between the control and the experimental condition is obtained 
does vary, however, across studies. Notably, the region of significance starts at a lower scale 
score for studies 1 and 3 compared to study 2 (around 18 vs. around 14). As a result, the 
experimental treatment is estimated to affect around 10% of the participants in studies 1 and 3 
but around 55% in studies 2. These differences reflect sample differences: Studies 1 and 3 are 
run with Amazon‘s Mechanical Turkers but study 2 college students. Prior research already 
established that workers on Mechanical Turk are more likely to be tightwads when compared 
to community samples (Goodman, Cryder, and Cheema 2013), which is also reflected in the 
average score on the spendthrift-scale (Mstudy1 = 13.41, Mstudy2 = 14.79, Mstudy3 = 13.20). The 
systematic variation across studies does caution to take potential differences in distribution of 
a target variable into account when inferring the point of impact of a treatment for a general 
population from results with AMT or student samples. This information should be taken into 
account when choosing to treat the tightwad-spendthrift scale as a continuous variable or 
recoding it to a categorical variable which has been done both (cf., Rick et al. 2008). 
Recoding the scale to a categorical variable does reduce the variance and therefore power of 
this measure. In addition, the arbitrary cutoff points that categorize the data could also differ 
from the real transition points in the sample hence reducing the strength of the (interaction) 
effects. In order to maximize power and the likelihood of observing the relevant effects, we 
decided to treat the tightwad-spendthrift scale as a continuous variable.  
In the introduction we speculated that spendthrifts act on the presumption of autonomy. 
Earlier findings suggest that spendthrifts act impulsively, which presupposes the freedom to 
do so. Indeed, our studies provide sufficient empirical evidence to support this theoretical 
argument. In both study 2 and study 3 we found that spendthrifts experience more autonomy 
in the unthreatening control conditions. This finding is in line with earlier work that 
documented a higher likelihood to experience positive feelings of autonomy for people free of 
chronic pains (Ryan and Frederick 1997) and offers a view on the unique psychology of 
spendthrifts. Further elaborating on this, the increased positive feelings of autonomy that 
spendthrifts experience could also indicate that spendthrifts reap additional reward from 
spending. Spending money may offer spendthrifts freedom and therefore bolsters feelings of 
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autonomy. If this interplay between autonomy and spending actually exist, it would be one 
reason to get locked in a continuous cycle of spending.  
7.1 Theoretical Contributions and Implications  
Our finding that personal control and autonomy is important for spendthrifts contributes 
to several streams of literature. First, we offer a more thorough understanding of a key causal 
determinant of spendthrifts‘ willingness to spend money. Up until now, the common 
assumption was that spendthrifts pretty much always spend money recklessly and wastefully 
(Rick and Loewenstein 2008). Our findings demonstrate that there is some observable 
rationale underlying spendthrifts‘ spending behavior. In particular, we demonstrate that 
spendthrifts do not spend when their sense of personal control is threatened and their feelings 
of autonomy diminished. Second, we advance knowledge about individual differences in 
spending behavior by illustrating that spendthrifts can also refrain from spending. Earlier 
research has examined how spending differences between spendthrifts and tightwads can 
vanish by encouraging tightwads to spend more (Rick et al. 2008). Our findings verify that the 
spending gap between spendthrifts and tightwads can also be bridged by getting spendthrifts 
to spend less. The current results may also offer some new insights for research investigating 
differences between how spendthrifts view practical versus pleasurable purchases. Prior 
research has already shown that some people are unable to indulge on pleasurable things 
(Kivetz and Simonson 2002). In contrast, we showed that spendthrifts tend to refrain from 
spending when they were forced to solve a practical problem. In fact, they were even less 
willing to spend than tightwads. However, general conclusions with regard to hedonic versus 
utilitarian consumption are precautionary. We did not explore the boundaries of this effect. 
Our empirical evidence does not allow to argue that spendthrifts will always spend less than 
tightwads in utilitarian shopping contexts. Presumably, their willingness to spend in utilitarian 
contexts is contingent upon, the degree to which the purchase elicited feelings of diminished 
personal control. 
Our current results could also be interpreted as spendthrifts‘ inability to make 
consequentialist decisions. This might be because they tend to be myopic and do not elaborate 
upon future outcomes (Haws and Poynor 2008; Lynch et al. 2010). Study 2 provides some 
evidence of this flaw. In this study, spendthrifts were less willing to spend money on bike 
related products when confronted with a transportation problem. When rationalizing about 
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bicycle commuting, it should become clear that this daily activity will inevitably lead to the 
experience of practical problems related to rain, nightfall or flat tires. Nevertheless, 
spendthrifts were not willing to spend more money on products that could offer practical 
solutions to these problems. This could be understood as a consequence of spendthrifts‘ 
disregard to elaborate on future unpleasant events. The findings of study 2 can thus be 
interpreted as spendthrifts‘ indifference for making thoughtful, consequentialist decisions. 
Tightwads and frugal people contemplate a lot and excessively plan their expenditures 
(Lastovicka et al. 1999; Rick et al. 2008). Despite all efforts, their spending behavior is not 
ideal as their sensitivity to the pain of paying ensures them to spend less than they preferably 
should. In our studies, we showed that tightwads were less likely to spend money on a 
pleasurable visit to the sauna, a bike to execute their hobby and the services provided by a 
spa. These findings are in accordance with previous research that documented individual 
differences in under-indulgence or hyperopia (Haws et al. 2011; Kivetz and Keinan 2006) and 
may be attributed to their inability to experience the positive consequences related to 
autonomy.  
Tightwads‘ strict decision making system requires them to exert a lot of self-control in 
order to pull the reins. This rigidness may convey that tightwads are driven by an introjected 
motivation (Ryan and Connell 1989). Holding an introjected motivation means that internal, 
esteem-based pressures direct behavior with the purpose of avoiding bad feelings such as guilt 
or shame. These internal pressures obviously limit tightwads‘ freedom of action. Tightwads‘ 
spending rules are often dictated by significant others in earlier stages of life (Lastovicka et al. 
1999). Later on, these enforced rules become an inseparable part of the individual during 
socialization processes and even exert influence in the absence of its root source. Because 
tightwads‘ spending behavior is guided by internal pressures, and they are less concerned with 
the fulfillment of transient desires, we believe that this urges them to act apathetically and 
uniformly across high versus low control situations. Consequently, they find it difficult to 
spend in most situations.  
7.2 Future Research Directions  
When overlooking the current findings on individual differences in spending behavior and 
comparing it with earlier findings, some potential consequences for subjective well-being 
emerge. Spendthrifts spend more than they ideally should, but it appears that they particularly 
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overspend on pleasurable goods and when they feel empowered and in control of the 
consumption situation. In addition, spendthrifts seem to be indifferent for the benefits of 
functional, practical goods. Consuming too little functional products could be detrimental for 
subjective well-being because these products help to prevent the experience of everyday 
hassles and annoyances. However, there is reason to believe that spendthrifts are not the only 
ones scoring lower on subjective well-being. Tightwads‘ under-consumption of pleasurable 
goods and their inability to indulge could also be detrimental for well-being. Taking all 
arguments into account; spendthrifts‘ and tightwads‘ spending strategies are potentially 
harmful for subjective well-being. Hence, there is reason to believe that the relation between 
individual differences in spending behavior and subjective well-being is curvilinear. 
Everything in moderation seems to be the best strategy to achieve everyday happiness. 
Not only consuming too little useful products hampers spendthrifts‘ well-being. 
Spendthrifts save less, often spend more than they have and are responsible for a substantial 
amount of the credit card debt (Rick et al. 2008). Indebtedness is a major cause of worry and 
the resulting loan defaults are perceived as a huge threat to the everyday lives of debtors 
(Wilson 2013). Survey research on potential reasons for credit card indebtedness revealed that 
60% of the debtors say that bad decisions are the root cause of their distressing situation 
(Brinker Report 2015). Our results indeed confirmed that spendthrifts are less occupied with 
rationalizing and we further showed that they are prone to situational cues. Spendthrifts‘ 
decision making ability could thus be improved by teaching them to make thoughtful 
decisions and immunizing them for situational cues.  
A more stringent intervention would be denying them all sense of personal control and thus 
externally limiting their spending behavior. It is however doubtful that such a strategy will 
have positive effects on the long run. Feelings of autonomy are considered an important 
human need and play a crucial role in subjective well-being. Lacking autonomy is detrimental 
for subjective well-being (Leotti et al. 2010). In addition, it is possible that spendthrifts will 
try to regain their autonomy in a subsequent situation, after their autonomy and freedom was 
blocked, by even spending more in the near future. For example, it is possible that 
spendthrifts will spend more in a new shopping situation when they just have been confronted 
with a lack of freedom due to third party interference or unavailable products. If spendthrifts 
indeed would spend more afterwards, blocking their autonomy could be a zero-sum game and 
would definitely not be beneficiary for subjective well-being. Future research should address 
these issues.  
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Further research should not only address the issue of how subjective well-being is related 
to individual differences in spending behavior, but could also focus on macro-level 
determinants of spendthrifts‘ spending behavior. Some societies leave more room for 
individuals to determine situational outcomes than other. Prior research acknowledges that 
cross-cultural differences in perceived control exist. For instance, Japanese society is more 
strictly organized than the U.S. (Berry 2002). Interestingly, credit card indebtedness occurs 
less frequently in Japan than in the US (The Economist 2001). Within country differences also 
exist. Survey research noted that citizens of Illinois perceived that they have more control 
over their lives, while citizens of Alabama believed that they had less control over their lives 
(Hock 2004). Statistics on indebtedness (Wilson 2013) reveal that citizens of Illinois on 
average carry $5,166 credit card debt per borrower and score higher than the US average of 
$4,965 credit card debt per borrower. While the citizens of Alabama on average carry $4,817 
credit card debt per borrower, which is below the US average. Indebtedness seems to occur 
more (less) frequently in societies that leave more room for personal control. Consequently, 
future research could investigate indebtedness from a macro-level perspective while taking 
individual differences in spending behavior and perceived (threats to) control into account. 
8. CONCLUSION 
We showed that spendthrifts refrain from spending when experiencing threats to personal 
control. When spendthrifts are not able to determine situational outcomes they become 
tightwads. Threats to personal control reduced their feelings of autonomy, a key driver of 
their spending behavior. These findings contribute to the research on individual differences in 
spending behavior by introducing threats to control as a new moderator. Besides these 
paradoxical finding, the current research is also new because we show that spending 
differences between tightwads and spendthrifts can drop by the latter spending less instead of 
the former spending more. 
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CHAPTER IV: HOW GOD DETERMINES WHAT WE BUY: 
RELIGIONS’ INFLUENCE ON IMPULSIVE CONSUMPTION 
 
mpulsive consumption is omnipresent in current day‘s society and constitutes a 
significant portion of companies‘ annual sales (Mogelonsky 1998). Impulsive purchases 
offer instant gratification but also lead to overspending. It has been shown that an 
important portion of today‘s credit card debt (and defaults) can be attributed to impulsive 
purchase behavior (Rick, Cryder, and Loewenstein 2008; Wilcox, Block, and Eisenstein 
2011). Impulsive purchases typically involve the desire to buy something and the subsequent 
(in)ability to exert control over this urge (Vohs and Faber 2007). This struggle is often 
conceptualized as a conflict between temporarily desires and longer term goals of behavior 
(Hoch and Loewenstein 1991). Interestingly, religion has been a source of such long-term 
ideals, values, morals and social expectations (McCullough and Willoughby 2009).Yet, prior 
research did never consider how religions steer impulsive purchase behavior. 
Religions provide a system of norms and values that can guide behavior in two different 
ways (Ryan, Rigby, and King 1993; Allport 1950; McCullough and Willoughby 2009; Allport 
and Ross 1967). First, religious beliefs and practices could be intrinsically adopted because of 
the compelling arguments. If intrinsically adopted, religious norms and values become one‘s 
own and automatically, effortlessly guide behavior. Second, religious systems could also be 
adopted because of self- and other-approval based pressures. If adopted because of external 
pressures, religion urges to deliberatively adjust behavior to the prevailing norms. The 
deliberative adjustment of behavior obviously requires more effort than the former. These two 
forms of religious internalization regulate behavior and can produce similar outcomes, but do 
spawn differences in the long run. The effortful, deliberate adjustment of behavior instead of a 
more autonomous drive has been associated with lower persistence and adherence 
(Baumeister 2002; Vohs and Faber 2007; Hofmann, Strack, and Deutsch 2008; Deci and 
Ryan 1985) and a decrease in psychological health (Bergin, Masters, and Richards 1987; 
Joiner, Perez, and Walker 2002; Tix and Frazier 2005; Ryan, Rigby, and King 1993).  
Prior research did not investigate how religiosity affects impulsive purchase behavior. In 
the current paper we strive to expand knowledge on this topic. Impulsive purchase behavior is 
socially undesirable (Zhang and Shrum 2009) and is considered sinful from a religious point 
of view. Religions typically differentiate between mortal/major and venial/minor sinful 
behavior (Kierkegaard 2007). In our studies, subtle reminders of religion in a scrambled 
I 
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sentence task urged to abstain from major sins because of an intrinsic devaluation of the 
product. The religious prime did not urge to intrinsically devalue minor sinful behavior, but 
the respondents abstained from it because of a concern with approval based pressures. 
We contribute to the research on the effects of religion (Rounding et al. 2012; Friese and 
Wänke 2014; McCullough and Willoughby 2009; Shariff and Norenzayan 2007; Tix and 
Frazier 2005) and impulsive consumption (Hoch and Loewenstein 1991; Baumeister 2002; 
Vohs and Faber 2007) by demonstrating causal influence from the former on the latter. In 
addition, our current findings further shed a light on the earlier documented increase and 
decreased subjective well-being associated with religion (Ryan, Rigby, and King 1993). Our 
current findings suggest that the decreases in subjective well-being could be attributed to 
inner twists related to the refrainment of intrinsically desirable but socially unwanted 
behavior. On the other hand, increases in subjective well-being could be related to religion 
promoting the intrinsic devaluation of the most deleterious sins.  
1. IMPULSIVE PURCHASE BEHAVIOR AND SELF-REGULATION 
Impulsive purchase behavior is conceptualized as a sudden powerful urge to consume 
immediately (Rook 1987). This sudden powerful urge results from the activation of hedonic 
goals upon the exposure to a pleasurable product or service. Whether consumers actually 
surrender to their prompting desires is contingent on their self-control or willpower. Hence 
impulsive purchases depend on how desirable the product is, and, if desirable, the 
psychological energy to overrule the craving for it. The desirability of a product depends on 
all kinds of sensory inputs (Vohs and Faber 2007). However, desires are more than visceral 
reactions and are subject to historical and societal trends (Belk, Ger, and Askegaard 2003). 
The willpower to resist temptations is considered finite and most consumers regularly 
succumb (Baumeister 2002). Nevertheless, lacking willpower to overrule immediate 
temptations is socially condemned and considered immature (Zhang and Shrum 2009). 
Impulsive purchase behavior is often approached as a problem of self-regulation and/or 
self-control. Self-regulation and self-control are very often used interchangeably, but do have 
some distinct features (Fitzsimons and Bargh 2004; McCullough and Willoughby 2009; 
Carver and Scheier 1998). Self-regulation involves the regulation of behavior in the pursuit of 
desired goals, not necessarily deliberative or effortful. Self-control on the other hand, refers to 
an individuals‘ ability to abstain from immediate desires in the light of earlier selected goals. 
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When exerting self-control, individuals deliberatively try to adjust their actions with 
predetermined rules, standards, values and goals in order to avoid feelings of guilt, shame or 
disapproval by others. Self-control requires effort and is viewed as a finite power that 
regularly fails. Self-regulation on the other hand is a more homeostatic process that 
automatically adjusts behavior. Self-regulation involves the autonomous selection of goals 
and desires. Both processes can evoke similar outcomes, but for different reasons. For 
example, people could refrain from eating cookies because they do not find it desirable (self-
regulation) or because they do not want to gain weight but still like them (self-control). Self-
regulation thus refers to the general desirability or intrinsic liking of a product. Self-control 
involves the willpower or psychological strength to overrule initial longing for a product. 
The conceptual distinction between self-regulation and self-control is illustrated by Carver 
and Scheier's (1998) model of behavioral regulation. Central to their theory is the view that 
self-regulation occurs at a more abstract level than self-control as it involves the selection of a 
particular set of reference goals and values. For example, healthiness and taking proper care 
of your body could serve as a self-regulatory goal. Self-control on the other hand is viewed as 
a dynamical mechanism that brings behavior into line with the selected values and goals 
through the operation of feedback loops. The first step in this mechanism involves the 
gathering of inputs and information about the current state of the selves. The next step is to 
compare this information to a reference value (e.g., norms and goals). If there is a discrepancy 
between the current state and the reference values, action should be undertaken to adjust 
behavior. For example, drinking alcohol could be in conflict with health goals. Refusing 
alcohol when it is offered is the action needed to bring behavior in line with the preselected 
norms and values. If there is no discrepancy, no actions will be undertaken. This process of 
feedback loops and the willpower to alter behavior is defined as self-control.  
Norms and values can be adopted for intrinsic reasons or because people feel an external 
coercion to do so (Ryan and Deci 2000). When accepted for external reasons, behavioral 
adjustment occurs less automatic and more self-control effort will be needed. For example, 
people may abstain to drink alcohol because it is socially unwanted but still like to drink it 
and thus have to suppress their thirst for alcohol. In one of the studies by Vohs and Faber 
(2007), half of the participants had to carry out a thought suppression task by attempting not 
to think about a white bear for 6 minutes. Afterwards, the participants that exerted control of 
their thoughts demonstrated greater impulse buying tendencies. The suppression of thoughts 
depleted self-control resources and made subsequent self-control endeavors less successful. 
Self-regulation, on the other hand, should not be subject to mental fatigue as it refers to the 
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intrinsic liking or disliking of a product. When a certain product is not perceived as tempting, 
no efforts should be undertaken to refrain from buying it. By now, it should be clear that self-
regulation and self-control are related to each other but do have some distinct features. 
Interestingly, both forms of behavioral regulation are known to operate in a religious belief 
system (McCullough and Willoughby 2009; Ryan, Rigby, and King 1993; Allport and Ross 
1967). 
2. RELIGION AND BEHAVIORAL REGULATION 
Religion is defined as a system of beliefs and practices which unite in a moral community 
(Durkheim 1912). Religions provide a collective consciousness and encompass moral forces 
that discriminate between what is approved and what is forbidden. Throughout history, 
religion has been a determining social force that regulates society and offered some 
evolutionary benefits (Weber 1920). For example, the protestant work ethic promoted an 
ascetic life with hard work as the essential prerequisite to successfulness. Research by Ryan et 
al. (1993) has demonstrated that religion‘s intrusive rules are adopted for different reasons. 
Religions‘ moral force can be intrinsically adopted because of the compelling arguments or 
because of approval based pressures. Interestingly, religion‘s functional impact on behavior is 
contingent on its degree of internalization. If religious beliefs are intrinsically adopted, 
behavioral regulation is labeled as identification and occurs more volitional and 
autonomously. Introjected regulation refers to behavioral change evoked by religion because 
of approval based pressures. 
Similar to self-regulation, identification involves the selection of goals and values on a 
higher level, and evokes autonomous reactions. For example, if a religion considers gambling 
as sinful and this value is intrinsically recognized, followers will never be tempted to gamble 
and automatically reject it. This is different for introjected regulation that occurs when 
individuals recognized a certain value, do not intrinsically accept it, but still abide it because 
of a concern with what others might think. Thus, similar to self-control, introjected regulation 
implicates an inner twist between intrinsic wants and discipline based pressures. An example 
of introjected regulation would be the abstention of gambling, not because you do not want it 
but because you are concerned with what others might think. Hence, religion can steer 
(impulsive) behavior in two separate ways. Following Hoch and Loewenstein's (1991) 
conceptualization of impulsive consumption, religious belief systems can both, but 
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independently affect the desirability of a product and the willpower to control the desirability 
for it.  
3. RELIGION AND IMPULSIVE CONSUMPTION 
Despite the potential straightforward interconnectedness between religiosity and 
impulsive purchase behavior, no direct causal influences from religion on impulsive purchase 
behavior have been documented. There is however correlational evidence supporting a link 
between religiosity and lower levels of substance abuse (Gorsuch 1995), initiation of 
marijuana and alcohol use for young adolescents (Kim-Spoon et al. 2014), lower levels of 
delinquency (Benda and Corwyn 1997), age of having sexual intercourse for the first time 
(Meier 2003), educational achievement (Lee 2002), more frequent dentist visits (Koenig, 
King, and Carson 2012), and wearing seatbelts (Wallace and Forman 1998). These kinds of 
behaviors could easily be associated with traits such as risk-seeking (Zuckerman and 
Kuhlman 2000) and need for stimulation (Carrol, Zuckerman, and Vogel 1982), which are all 
closely related to impulsive purchase behavior. Indeed, this correlational evidence suggests a 
general link between religiosity and a general tendency to regulate behavior. Though, it does 
not allow to determine any causal influences or to disentangle different forms of behavioral 
regulation. 
Earlier research established a causal relationship between religiosity and willpower, but 
did not focus on impulsive purchase behavior. Shariff and Norenzayan (2007) demonstrated 
that subtle religious primes (scrambled sentence task) encouraged pro-social behavior in a 
dictator game. More recently, Rounding et al. (2012) showed that the same religious prime 
gave participants the courage to endure more discomfort (drinking a mixture of orange juice 
and vinegar), were willing to wait longer for a larger monetary reward and performed better 
on the STROOP-task. This evidence confirms religion‘s causal influence on self-control and 
willpower in general. Nonetheless, Rounding et al. (2012) did not address purchase behavior 
and they focused on self-control but not on self-regulation. They did not investigate how 
religious primes could affect the desirability of a product. Building on Rounding et al.'s 
(2012) earlier findings, it is not evident to predict whether individuals will refrain from 
impulsive consumption because they are concerned with approval based pressures or because 
they do not feel any urges or desires to buy the product. 
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Impulsive purchases occur because consumers become attracted by a stimulus or product. 
When consumers suddenly become attracted by a product, the ability to control their impulses 
will determine whether they will buy the product or not. One reason not to spend money 
could be approval based pressures. When concerned with approval based pressures, it requires 
effort to overrule the desire for a product. However, impulsive purchase behavior could also 
be regulated by religion in a more volitional way. Deeper rooted religious norms and values 
can steer behavior in a more automatic fashion. For example, if certain religious values and 
norms disapprove a specific kind of purchase consumers may simply not be attracted by the 
product. In such cases, the product is not desirable and no problem of willpower to resist will 
exist. An example would be eating pork meat for Muslims. When confronted with the 
possibility to eat pork, intentions or behavior should not be changed because they intrinsically 
disapprove this kind of meat. In such a situation, no problem of self-control will occur 
because there is no temptation or incipient urge.  
Disentangling both explanatory processes is important because the deliberative 
adjustment of behavior has shown to be less effective in the longer run. Automatic or 
volitional steering of behavior is more enduring. Presumably, religiosity steers impulsive 
purchase behavior through both processes. We aim to test how religion affects impulsive 
purchase behavior by either affecting the desirability of a product and/or by offering the 
willpower to overrule intrinsic but condemned urges. 
Religion steers impulsive behavior by differentiating between moral and sinful 
alternatives. Religious norms and values forbid the purchase or consumption of so called 
―heathen‖ products. However, religions do not merely discriminate between what is good 
versus bad. Religious belief systems recognize that some minor sins are sometimes inevitable. 
Indeed, religions differentiate between more and less sinful behavior (Kierkegaard 2007). For 
example, Catholicism differentiates between mortal sins and venial sins. Mortal sins condemn 
a person to hell after death; venial sins do not condemn a person to hell but only cause a 
partial and temporary loss of grace. It seems straightforward that indulging on cookies is less 
sinful than substance use. Nevertheless, religious definitions of sins are abstract and typically 
remain silent about how to practically define minor versus major sinful behavior. Practical 
guidance of what is sinful largely depends on how individuals interpret it and on how opinion 
leaders put it forward (Riley 2008).  
Fishbach and Converse (2011) argue the existence of two different self-regulatory 
problems. The first one is the traditional dilemma conceptualized as a conflict between urging 
desires and longer term goals. The second type of dilemma is the so-called epsilon temptation. 
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These kinds of temptations have negligible negative consequences in the long run, unless the 
behavior becomes repetitive. Similar to minor sinful behavior, epsilon temptations are less 
problematic when incidental. For example, indulging in cookies is not really a (health) 
problem if it occurs seldom. As religions differentiate between different kinds of sins, it is 
likely that exposure to religion can have different effects depending on how sinful the 
behavior actually is.  
Religions represent a cultural mechanism that works in function of the group by rewarding 
behavior that benefits the group and punishing behavior that is detrimental for the common 
good (Baumeister 2010). Most sinful is behavior that endangers the group. For example, the 
consumption of alcohol should be considered very sinful because it potentially leads to 
addiction and ultimately to the destabilization of society. Consequently, religion should have 
a negative impact on the evaluation and consumption of alcohol. Yet, not all sinful behavior 
has a direct negative impact on society. Indulging behavior is considered to be egoistic 
because it preoccupies people with their own pleasure instead of the common cause. Getting a 
personal treatment at a local spa is not harmful for society, but it puts personal pleasure above 
other things. Hence, religion could activate a concern with approval based pressures because 
such behavior is rather egoistic instead of social. Religions should be more tolerant on such 
behavior because it does not directly affect the stability of the group, but could still activate a 
concern with approval based pressures. In what follows, we speculate that the distinction 
between minor and major sinful behavior will determine the desirability of a product and thus 
could also determine which form of behavioral regulation that will come into play. We 
hypothesize that religious primes will incite individuals to refrain from all types of sinful 
behavior. Yet, we assume that religious primes will urge to refrain from major versus minor 
sinful behavior for different reasons. In particular, we speculate that minor sins are a matter of 
self-control and willpower. Major sins on the other hand could be a matter of desirability. 
Religious systems have some clear rules about what is normatively good or bad, but 
sometimes temporarily condone minor sins. If a certain product is seriously wrongful and 
immoral from a religious point of view, religious primes could remind consumers that the 
product is not desirable and hence limit its consumption. If a product is perceived as 
moderately sinful from a religious point of view, religious primes could remind consumers 
that the product is unwanted but sometimes condoned. Hence, it is less likely that religious 
primes will affect the desirability of a product than, but will rather activate a concern with 
approval based pressures. 
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4. STUDY OVERVIEW 
Across three studies we tested how religion can affect impulsive purchase behavior. In a 
first study we compared U.S. state-level data on religiosity with statistics on credit card 
indebtedness. Credit card debt has several times been associated with impulsive spending 
behavior (Rick, Cryder, and Loewenstein 2008; Wilcox, Block, and Eisenstein 2011). We 
tested whether religious affiliation can predict credit card debt by relying on real-world data. 
In study 2 and 3 we experimentally manipulated religiosity to investigate the underlying 
processes. To test the different processes of behavioral regulation, we used a less sinful 
product in study 2 compared to study 3. Study 2 conceptualized impulsive purchase behavior 
as the willingness to spend money on a pleasurable massage at a spa. Study 3 investigates the 
willingness to spend money on a case of wine. The extent to which a certain product or 
behavior is considered sinful is not always logically deductible and largely depends on the 
evaluation of opinion leaders (Riley 2008). Consequently, the sinfulness of a product depends 
on its subjective judgment. To ascertain that getting a massage was considered less sinful than 
drinking alcohol we performed a pretest. Pretests with U.S. participants through MTurk (n= 
40) showed that drinking alcohol was considered as more sinful (F(1, 39) = 6.01, p = .02), a 
bigger violation of religious principles (F(1, 39) = 15.56, p < .001) and was rated worse than 
getting a massage (F(1, 39) = 31.32, p < .001). In study 2 we tested if religious primes could 
urge people to deliberatively refrain from desirable products because of approval based 
pressures. In study 3 we tested whether religious primes can also affect the desirability or 
intrinsic liking of a product. 
5. STUDY 1: RELIGIOSITY AND CREDIT CARD DEBT IN THE U.S. 
The goal of study 1 was to test if religious people buy less on impulse. Prior research has 
shown that impulsive spending could result in higher levels of household debt (Schorr 1998) 
and credit card debt in particular (Wilcox, Block, and Eisenstein 2011). Credit cards are used 
as a guilt reducing tool to purchase pleasurable products because it makes the transfer of 
money less salient (Thomas, Desai, and Seenivasan 2011). We obtained the state-level 
average credit card debt per borrower from a TransUnion 
(http://www.transunioninsights.com) credit report in 2013. In 2013, a credit card debtor in the 
U.S. carried an average of $4,965 credit card debt. Data from religiosity across the U.S. was 
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obtained from the Pew Research Center‘s (http://www.pewresearch.org) most recent Religion 
Landscape Survey in 2008. Approximately 35,000 citizens of Continental U.S. who were 
older than 18 years were interviewed through telephone calls about their religious affiliation. 
This survey includes information on their self-reported religious beliefs and practices. On 
average, 78.4% reported being Christian (Protestants and Catholics), 4.7% of the respondents 
adhered another religion (Mainly Jewish, Buddhists and Muslims) and 16.9% reported being 
unaffiliated. Besides information on religious affiliations the data also contains percentages 
about general believe in God (absolutely certain, fairly certain, not too certain, do not 
believe), frequency of prayer (at least once a day, once a week, few times a week, few times a 
month, seldom or not), attending religious services (at least once a week, once or twice a 
month, seldom or not) and how important religion is for someone (very important, somewhat 
important, not too important). For each question, we calculated weighted indexes based on the 
different options and the portion of people that indicated the options. 
We also wanted to control for potential confounds. Earlier research (Griskevicius et al. 
2012) demonstrated that state level average credit card debt can be attributed to the portion of 
men living per state. In addition, social economic status is likely to affect impulsive purchase 
behavior and thus also credit card debt (Wood 1998). To be able to control for these 
confounds, we gathered information on gender ratios (calculated as the number of males per 
100 females per state in 2010), gross domestic product (GDP) per capita (per state for 2008), 
and educational attainment (percentage of people that finished high school per state in 2008) 
from the U.S. Census Bureau (www.census.gov).  
5.1 Results 
In accordance with our predictions, correlational analysis yielded a negative relation 
between the state-level average percentage of affiliated people and average credit card debt 
per borrower for each state (r = -.35, p < .01). Subsequently, we tested for potential 
confounds. The more men living per state correlated with lower percentages of affiliated 
people per state (r = -.31, p < .05). However, the portion of men living per state was not 
related to credit card debt statistics (r = .03, p = .85). There was a weak correlation between 
our measure of credit card debt and GDP per capita (r = .25, p = .08), but GDP per capita did 
not correlate with the portion of affiliated people per state (r = -.20, p = .17). The average 
percentage of affiliated people per state correlated negatively with the average percentage of 
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people that finished high school (r = -.44, p < .001). Finishing high school was not related to 
credit card debt (r = -.01, p = .92). Importantly, controlling for gender ratios, GDP per capita 
and educational attainment did not significantly affect the negative correlation between 
percentage affiliated and credit card debt (β = -.38, p < .01). To test whether credit card debt 
also correlated with the other religious beliefs and practices, we calculated a weighted index 
for each question. The correlation matrix below (table 1) displays the partial correlations 
(controlling for gender ratios and educational attainment) between the measures of religiosity 
and credit card debt. 
Each measure of religiosity correlated negatively with credit card debt. A factor analysis 
revealed that all these questions measure one construct. Based on this analysis, we calculated 
an overall index of religiosity (α = .97) which was also negatively correlated with credit card 
indebtedness (r = -.44, p < .01). 
 
Table 1. Partial correlations between religiosity and credit card debt 
  Credit 
card debt 
Religious 
affiliation 
Religion‘s 
importance 
Attending 
services 
Believe 
in god 
Frequency 
of prayer 
Religious 
affiliation 
-.38* 
     
Religion‘s 
importance 
-.42* .84** 
    
Attending 
services 
-.43* .87** .93** 
   
Believe in 
god 
-.40* .80** .90** .86** 
  
Frequency of 
prayer 
-.44* .75** .90** .88** .95** 
 
Overall 
index 
-.44* .84** .96** .95** .97** .97** 
* p < .01 ** p < .001    
5.2 Discussion 
The merit of this first study is that we are able to document religions‘ influence on 
impulsive consumption with real-life data. However, credit card debt served as a proxy 
measure of impulsive spending behavior. We did not actually measure impulsive purchase 
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behavior. Another shortcoming that comes with the use of real-world data is that we were not 
able to control for all possible confounds. For instance, the average number of credit cards 
issued per person could confound our results. Yet, the credit card report that we relied on did 
not communicate such information. In addition, the correlational evidence of this first study 
does not allow making causal inferences. Nor does it allow us to assess process evidence or to 
differentiate between the two forms of behavioral regulation. We aim to address these 
shortcomings in an experimental set-up.  
6. STUDY 2: RELIGIOUS PRIMES AND WILLINGNESS TO SPEND MONEY ON 
A MASSAGE 
The goal of study 2 is twofold. First, we aim to experimentally replicate the findings of the 
first study by showing that reminders of religiosity refrain people from buying hedonically 
tempting products. Priming individuals with religious concepts should activate a value system 
that allows discriminating between what is right and wrong. Besides the activation of a value 
system, exposure to religion also offers individuals the energy needed to overrule impulsive 
responses (Rounding et al. 2012). Second, we hope to offer some procedural evidence. Study 
2 investigates how reminders of religion could affect the willingness to spend money on a 
massage. As mentioned, getting a massage was pretested as a minor sin. We argued that 
exposure to religiosity will not affect the liking or desirability of minor sinful behavior. 
Instead, people will rather refrain from it because of approval based pressures. Documenting 
this relationship is the main goal of study 2. In this study we also use a hedonic versus 
utilitarian framing of the massage. In the hedonic condition the massage was framed as 
pleasurable, in the utilitarian condition we told that the massage was on medical advice. 
Health and sanity are religious ideals (Riley 2008), hence we expect that reminders of religion 
will only affect the willingness to spend money on the hedonic massage. In the current study, 
we differentiate between a hedonic versus utilitarian massage because we do not expect that 
religiosity will affect the willingness to spend money on a utilitarian product.  
6.1 Method 
The current study has a 2×2 between subjects factorial design. All respondents were 
randomly assigned to the conditions. To start, we primed the participants either with religious 
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or neutral concepts. Subsequently, they had to indicate to what extent they were willing to 
spend $100 on a hedonic or a utilitarian massage. In total, 154 respondents (Mage = 35.12, SD 
= 12.22; 54% male and 46% female) participated in an online experiment that was offered 
through Amazon Mechanical Turk and received $.25. Nine respondents were excluded from 
the original sample because they did not answer a control question correctly. 
We relied on an already established scrambled sentence task to prime religiosity 
(Rounding et al. 2012; Shariff and Norenzayan 2007; Srull and Wyer 1979). The scrambled 
sentence task required the participants to unscramble five-word sentences by dropping an 
irrelevant word. In total, the participants had to unscramble ten sentences. In the religious 
prime condition, five of the ten sentences contained a religious word (God, spirit, divine, 
prophet or sacred). For example, the scrambled sentence ―dessert divine was for the‖ could be 
unscrambled by making ―the dessert was divine‖. The remaining sentences contained only 
neutral words. In the neutral prime condition, all sentences contained neutral words. For 
example, the neutral scrambled sentence ―sky the seamless blue is‖ could be unscramble by 
―the sky is blue‖. Upfront, we asked the participants to make logical and grammatically 
correct sentences. 
After the priming task the respondents were asked to what extent they would be willing to 
spend money ($100) on a hedonic versus utilitarian massage. In the hedonic condition they 
read: ―Imagine that you find massages very pleasurable (no need to imagine if it is actually 
true). You shop around and find an excellent spa that offers a pleasurable massage for $100.‖ 
Respondents in the utilitarian condition read the following scenario: ―Imagine that your back 
has been bothering you lately. You shop around and find and excellent clinic that offers a 
therapeutic massage for $100. Your insurance does not cover the cost.‖ Subsequently, we 
asked if they would be willing to purchase the massage (1 definitely will not; 7 definitely 
will). Afterwards we asked how desirable the massage is and if taking the massage would 
evoke concerns with approval based pressures. The already established measures that assess 
the intrinsic preference for something and the concern with approval based pressures are 
domain specific, thus we constructed our items by adapting a previously established one 
(Ryan, Rigby, and King 1993). We assessed the intrinsic desirability (―I would greatly enjoy 
the massage‖, ―The massage would offer me a great experience‖, ―A massage is truly fun‖, 
―A massage would be very satisfying to me‖; α = .85) and concern with approval based 
pressures (―I would feel bad if I would get the massage‖, ―I would feel guilty if I would get 
the massage‖, ―I would feel ashamed If I would get the massage‖, ―Others would disapprove 
me if I would get the massage‖; α = .92) on 7-point scales (1 strongly disagree; 7 strongly 
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agree). To ascertain the validity of our scale, we ran a factor analysis (KMO = .82, Bartlett‘s 
test of sphericity: χ²(28) = 850.83, p < .001) which yielded two dimensions based on the scree 
plot and factor loadings. In addition, the correlation between both dimensions was negative (r 
= -.19, p < .05). 
At the end of the study we also asked the respondents whether they considered themselves 
to be Protestant, Catholic, Mormon, Jehovah‘s witnesses, Muslim, another religion or 
unaffiliated. 
6.2 Results 
In total, 83 respondents reported being religiously affiliated (26 Protestants, 27 Catholics, 
3 Mormons, 1 Jehovah‘s witnesses, 1 Muslim and 25 were affiliated with another religion). 
The affiliated versus unaffiliated respondents were evenly distributes across the religious and 
neutral prime conditions (χ²(1, 154) = 0.92, p = .34). In what follows, we report first the 
willingness to spend on the massage. Subsequently, we report evidence on the mediating 
processes. 
 
Willingness to buy: Overall, the religious (M = 3.16, SD = 1.56) versus neutral (M = 3.17, SD 
= 1.61) scrambled sentence task did not affect willingness to buy the massage (F(1, 153) = 
.025, p = .87). Nor was the main of effect of the hedonic (M = 3.14, SD =1.51) versus 
utilitarian massage significant (M = 3.19, SD = 1.65; F(1, 153) = .06, p = .80). More 
importantly, the interaction (see graph 1) between the priming task and type of massage was 
significant (F(1, 153) = 9.40, p < .01). Follow-up analysis revealed that the respondents‘ 
willingness to buy the hedonic massage dropped if they received the religious prime (M = 
2.72, SD = 1.26) instead of the neutral one (M = 3.53, SD = 1.64; F(1, 150) = 5.00, p = .03). 
Participants who were primed with religious concepts were also less willing to buy the 
massage when it was hedonically framed (M = 2.72, SD = 1.26) compared to the utilitarian 
framing (M = 3.55, SD = 1.71; F(1, 150) = 4.01, p = .04). After receiving the religious prime, 
the respondents were more willing to spend $100 on a utilitarian massage (M = 3.55, SD = 
1.71) compared to a hedonic massage (M = 2.83; SD = 1.52; F(1, 150) = 4.40, p = .04). 
Lastly, the respondents were more willing to spend money on the hedonic massage (M = 3.53, 
SD = 1.64) compared to the utilitarian massage (M = 2.83, SD = 1.52; F(1, 150) = 5.43, p = 
.02) after completing the neutral scrambled sentence task.  
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Graph 1. Scrambled sentences × Type of massage on willingness to buy 
 
 
Desirability of the massage: Most noteworthy is that all respondents scored relatively high on 
this measure, indicating that massages are generally perceived as desirable. There were no 
significant differences in desirability of the massage after the respondents were primed with 
the religious (M = 5.29, SD =1.28) versus neutral concepts (M = 5.24, SD = 1.33; F(1, 153) = 
.078, p = .78). Nor were there significant difference across the hedonic (M = 5.40, SD =1.27) 
versus utilitarian conditions (M = 5.15, SD = 1.32; F(1, 153) = 1.417, p = .24). Neither was 
the interaction significant (F(1, 153) = .136, p = .71).  
 
Concern with approval based pressures: The main effect of the religious prime (M = 3.42, SD 
=1.49) versus neutral prime (M = 3.21, SD = 1.50) on concern with approval based pressures 
was not significant (F(1, 153) = .984, p = .32). Nor was it affected by the hedonic (M = 3.45, 
SD =1.49) versus utilitarian framing of the massage (M = 3.20, SD = 1.50; F(1, 153) = 1.14, p 
= .29). Yet, the interaction (see graph 2) demanded further inspection (F(1, 153) = 3.54, p = 
.06). Post hoc analysis yielded that the religious prime (M = 3.80, SD = 1.46) evoked a bigger 
concern with approval based pressures for the hedonic product than the neutral prime (M = 
3.11, SD = 1.45; F(1, 150) = 3.97, p = .04 ). In addition, the religious prime evoked these 
pressures significantly more in the hedonic condition (M = 3.80 ; SD = 1.46) than in the 
utilitarian one (M = 3.09, SD = 1.44; F(1, 150) = 4.29, p = .04). 
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Graph 2. Scrambled sentences × Type of massage on concern with approval based pressures 
 
 
Within the neutral prime condition, there was no significant difference between the hedonic 
(M = 3.11, SD = 1.45) and utilitarian (M = 3.31, SD = 1.56) manipulation (F(1, 150) = .34, p 
= .56). Neither was there a significant difference between the religious (M = 3.09, SD = 1.44) 
and neutral prime (M = 3.31, SD = 1.56) within the utilitarian condition (F(1, 150) = .41, p = 
.52). 
 
Mediation analysis: All mediation analyses were performed by using the Preacher and Hayes 
(2008) macro to estimate the indirect effects (model 8). All the indirect effects were estimated 
using 10,000 bias-corrected bootstrap resamples. In this section we wanted to test whether 
willingness to spend across the conditions could be explained by desirability of the massage 
and/or a concern with approval based pressures. First, we tested if the desirability mediates 
type of prime × type of massage on willingness to spend. The indirect effect of desirability 
was not significant (β = -.07, LL = -.46; UL = .27). Second, we tested if the willingness to buy 
the massage across type of prime × type of massage could be explained by the differences in 
concern with approval based pressures. This mediation analysis revealed a positive and 
significant indirect effect of concern with approval based pressures (β = .32) as the estimated 
95% confidence interval did not include zero (LL = .02; UL = .79).  
Further analysis yielded a significant conditional indirect effect of concern with approval 
based pressures for the hedonic massage after being primed with religion (β = -.20, LL = -.55; 
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UL = -.01). In addition, the conditional direct effect of the hedonic manipulation after 
receiving the religious prime was no longer significant when controlling for concerns with 
approval based pressures (β = -.60; t(154) = -1.76, p = .08). Hence the effect of religion in the 
hedonic condition is mediated by concern with approval based pressures. The religious prime 
did not affect the conditional indirect effect of concern with approval based pressures in the 
utilitarian condition (β = .08, LL = -.14; UL = .34). When controlling for concern with 
approval based pressures, the conditional direct effect of the utilitarian massage after the 
religious prime remained significant (β = .65; t(154) = 1.96, p = .05). To summarize, we offer 
an empirical explanation for the reduced willingness to spend on the hedonic massage but not 
for the increased willingness to spend on the utilitarian massage. 
6.3 Discussion 
In this second study we experimentally demonstrated that religious primes reduced the 
willingness to spend money on a hedonic massage. These results confirm the causal influence 
from religiosity on impulsive purchase behavior. Up to now, only correlational evidence 
documented such link. We also provide some procedural evidence and show why religious 
primes could limit impulsive purchase behavior. In particular, the respondents found the 
massage desirable (cf., relatively high score on the intrinsic pleasure scale). Yet, approval 
based pressures urged to exert self-control and tied down their willingness to spend money on 
the hedonic massage. Furthermore, the religious condition mirrors the neutral condition. 
Within the neutral condition, the respondents were more willing to spend on the hedonic 
massage. Within the religious condition, the respondents were more willing to spend on the 
utilitarian massage. The higher willingness to spend money on the hedonic massage within 
the neutral condition could be possible attributed to the higher autonomy consumers usually 
experience in hedonic purchase situations (cf., Botti and McGill 2011) which may boost 
spending behavior. More unexpected is the finding that religious primes encouraged to spend 
money on the utilitarian massage. A possible explanation could be the framing of the 
utilitarian massage; we framed it as something that was ought to do. Presumably, reminders of 
religiosity incited the participants to take proper care of their body which is encouraged by 
religions (Riley 2008). 
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7. STUDY 3: RELGIOUS PRIMES AND THE WILLINGNESS TO SPEND MONEY 
ON WINE 
In study 2, we only tested impulsive purchase behavior regarding moderately sinful 
behavior. We argued that concerns with approval based pressures could regulate moderately 
sinful behavior. We also hypothesized that reminders of religion could reduce the intrinsic 
desirability of major sinful product and hence urge to refrain from impulsive consumption for 
a different reason. Our pretest revealed that the consumption of alcohol is considered as more 
sinful than getting a massage. In study 3 we hope to test how religion could alter consumers‘ 
intrinsic desire for alcohol. In particular, we investigate how religion could affect the intrinsic 
desirability of alcohol and consequently the willingness to spend money on it.  
7.1 Method 
In total, 158 U.S.-respondents (Mage = 35.06 SD = 11.73, 45% male and 55% female) 
were recruited through Amazon Mechanical Turk and got $.25. Nine respondents were 
excluded from the original sample because they did not answer correctly on the control 
question. Study 3 has a 2×2 between subjects factorial design. All respondents were randomly 
assigned to the conditions. Identical to the previous study, the respondents first had to 
unscramble 10 sentences to prime them either with religious or neutral concepts. After 
completing the priming task, the respondents had to imagine either a hedonic or utilitarian 
scenario. In the hedonic condition they read the following scenario: ―Imagine that you like to 
drink wine (no need to do so if it is actually true). You look around and find a case with six 
bottles of good wine for $80.‖ In the utilitarian condition they were instructed to consider the 
healthy benefits of drinking wine: ―Imagine that you have been suffering from high 
cholesterol and your physician told you that moderately drinking red wine could offer you 
healthy benefits. Wine reduces blood clotting, by thinning the blood and dampening proteins 
that promote blood clots. You look around and find a case with six bottles of wine for $80.‖ 
After reading one of the two scenarios we asked whether they would be willing to purchase 
the case of wine (1 definitely will not; 7 definitely will). To measure concern with approval 
based pressures (α = .92) and desirability of the wine (α = .92) we adopted the questions from 
study 2. Both scales were again negatively correlated (r -.36, p <.001). At the end of the 
survey, the respondents were asked to report their religious affiliation. 
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7.2  Results  
In total, 80 participants considered themselves to be religiously affiliated (38 Protestants, 
20 Catholics, 2 Mormons, 1 Muslim, 21 were affiliated with another) and 76 were 
unaffiliated. The (un)affiliated participants were evenly distributed across the religious and 
neutral conditions (χ²(1, 158) = 0.08, p = .78). First, we analyzed the willingness to spend 
money on the wine. Next, we examined the effects on intrinsic desirability of the wine and 
concern with approval based pressures. Lastly, we tested whether these forms of regulation 
could offer some procedural evidence. 
 
Willingness to buy: On average, the religious prime (M = 4.57, SD = 1.46) did not affect 
willingness to spend money on the case of wine (M = 4.81, SD = 1.52; F(1, 157) = .66, p = 
.42). Nor were the respondents willing to spend more (or less) money on wine in the hedonic 
(M = 4.72, SD =1.50) versus the utilitarian condition (M = 4.68, SD = 1.50; F(1, 157) = .02, p 
= .88). However, the interaction (see graph 3) between the manipulation and the hedonic 
versus utilitarian condition was significant (F(1, 157) = 6.11, p = .02). 
 
Graph 3. Scrambled sentences × Type of wine on willingness to buy 
 
 
Follow-up analysis clarified that the religious prime reduced the willingness to spend money 
on the hedonically framed wine (M = 4.36, SD = 1.61) relative to the neutral prime (M = 5.15, 
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SD = 1.25; F(1, 154) = 6.14, p = .014). Willingness to spend money on wine was lower after 
the religious prime for the hedonic (M = 4.36, SD = 1.61) compared to the utilitarian 
condition (M = 4.92, SD = 1.09), but not significantly (F(1, 154) = 2.42, p = .12). After 
unscrambling the neutral sentences, the respondents were more likely to spend money on the 
wine when it was hedonically framed (M = 5.15, SD = 1.25) than when it was utilitarian 
framed (M = 4.52, SD = 1.68; F(1, 154) = 3.87, p = .05). Willingness to spend money on the 
utilitarian framed wine did not differ when being primed with religious (M = 4.92, SD = 1.09) 
or neutral concepts (M = 4.52, SD = 1.68; F(1, 154) = 1.23, p = .27). 
 
Desirability of the wine: The religious (M = 4.94, SD =1.49) versus neutral (M = 5.17, SD = 
1.40) scrambled sentence task did not affect the desirability of consuming alcohol (F(1, 157) 
= .786, p = .38). Nor did the hedonic (M = 5.13, SD =1.50) versus utilitarian (M = 4.98, SD = 
1.38) framing of alcohol affect its desirability (F(1, 157) = .39, p = .53). However, the 
interaction (see graph 4) between both factors was significant (F(1, 157) = 4.79, p = .03). 
 
Graph 4. Scrambled sentences × Type of wine on desirability of wine 
 
 
When the consumption of alcohol was hedonically framed, the participants found alcohol less 
desirable after exposure to the religious primes (M 4.81, SD = 1.67) when compared to the 
neutral condition (M 5.53, SD = 1.16; F(1, 154) = 5.39, p = .02). After religious exposure, the 
consumption of alcohol was not evaluated differently when it was framed as hedonic (M = 
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4.81, SD = 1.67) or utilitarian (M = 5.17, SD = 1.09; F(1, 154) = 1.09, p = .30). Participants 
who completed the neutral prime found the consumption of alcohol more desirable when it 
was framed hedonically (M = 5.53, SD = 1.16) relative to utilitarian (M = 4.87, SD = 1.52; 
F(1, 154) = 4.477, p = .04). Framing the consumption of alcohol in a utilitarian way did not 
alter intrinsic evaluations when unscrambling the religious (M = 5.17, SD = 1.09) versus 
neutral sentences (M = 4.87, SD = 1.52; F(1, 154) = .753, p = .39). 
 
Concern with approval based pressures: On average (M = 5.26, SD = 1.44) the respondents 
scored relatively high on this measure, indicating that the consumption of alcohol is generally 
disapproved. The main effect of the religious (M = 5.37, SD =1.53) versus neutral prime (M = 
5.17, SD = 1.03) was not significant (F(1, 157) = .93, p = .34). The main effect of the hedonic 
(M = 5.26, SD =1.47) versus utilitarian manipulation (M = 5.27, SD = 1.04) was also not 
significant (F(1, 157) = .04, p = .84). Neither was their interaction significant (F(1, 157) = 
.001, p = .98). 
 
Mediation analysis: The goal is to test whether type of prime × type of wine predicting 
willingness to spend money on the case of wine is mediated by desirability of wine and/or a 
concern with approval based pressures. First, we tested the mediating effects of desirability of 
the wine (Preacher and Hayes 2008). The indirect effect of intrinsic regulation was significant 
(β = -.77, LL = -1.52; UL = -.13). Further inspection showed a significant conditional indirect 
effect of desirability in the hedonic condition after being primed with religious concepts (β = -
.54, LL = -1.05; UL = -.10). The conditional direct effect of the hedonic condition after 
receiving the religious prime was no longer significant when controlling for desirability (β = -
.25; t(154) = -1.12, p = .26). Consequently, the reduced willingness to spend money on the 
hedonic wine after receiving the religious prime is mediated by a reduced desirability. In 
addition, the conditional indirect effect of desirability was not significant for the utilitarian 
condition after the religious prime (β = .23, LL = -.19; UL = .77). The conditional direct effect 
of the utilitarian condition, after the religious prime, was not significant when controlling for 
desirability (β = .17; t(154) = .69, p = .49). Second, we tested if a concern with approval based 
pressures mediates the interaction explaining willingness to spend money on wine. This 
analysis did not yield a significant indirect effect of concern with approval based pressures (β 
= -.01, LL = -.26; UL = .18). Consequently, concern with approval based pressures is not a 
mediator in study 3. 
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7.3 Discussion 
In study 3 we demonstrated that willingness to spend money on alcohol is contingent upon 
exposure to religious concepts. Priming individuals by means of a scrambled sentence task 
with religious concepts decreased the willingness to spend money on wine. Within the 
religious prime condition, the respondents did not express a higher or lower willingness to 
buy the hedonic versus utilitarian wine. This is contrary to study 2 in which the religious 
prime increased the willingness to spend on the utilitarian alternative. Presumably, it is more 
difficult to sell the health benefits of alcohol compared to massages which could explain this 
inconsistency across study 2 and 3. Similar to study 2, within the neutral prime condition, the 
respondents did express a higher willingness to spend money on the hedonic alternative 
compared to the utilitarian one. As in study 2, this may be attributed to differences in 
autonomy and freedom (cf., Botti and McGill 2011) 
The willingness to spend money on wine was mediated by a reduced desirability. The 
current results support the idea that religion can affect the desirability of a product and 
subsequently influence impulsive purchase behavior. All the participants were concerned with 
approval based pressures associated with drinking alcohol. The experience of approval based 
pressures did not mediate the observed differences in willingness to spend. 
A potential drawback of the current study is that we use the willingness to spend money 
on alcohol. Drinking alcohol is prohibited for Muslims, and could even be legally punished in 
some Muslim countries. Muslims‘ willingness to spend money on alcohol could thus be 
inappropriate. In spite of these concerns, only 1 self-reported Muslim participated in our 
study. Excluding this participant from the analyses did not alter our conclusions.  
8. GENERAL DISCUSSION 
The main goal of the current research was to discover how religiosity affects impulsive 
purchase behavior. Religion is known to affect behavior (Ryan, Rigby, and King 1993; 
Allport and Ross 1967) and triggers self-discipline (Rounding et al. 2012). Some earlier 
correlational evidence already suggested that religiosity could steer impulsive urges (e.g., 
Benda and Corwyn 1997; Gorsuch 1995; Meier 2003), but no causal explanatory mechanism 
has been identified. Earlier research by Ryan, Rigby, and King (1993) demonstrated that 
religion could change behavior for intrinsic reasons and/or because of a concern with approval 
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based pressures. Interestingly, these two forms of behavioral regulation also play a role in 
impulsive purchase behavior. Impulsive purchase behavior occurs because a product is 
viewed as desirable and consumers lack the ability to control their desires for that product 
(Hoch and Loewenstein 1991). The intrinsic valuation covers the desirability of a product, 
and one reason to take control over desires could be a fear for approval based pressures (e.g., 
guilt, shame or anxiety). We speculated that exposure to religion could inhibit impulsive 
purchase behavior for two different reasons. In particular, we investigated if the reason to 
abstain from impulsive purchase behavior is contingent upon the moral classification of the 
tempting impulse. We tested if a concern with approval based pressures regulates minor sinful 
behavior and that major sins are no longer perceived as desirable after being exposed to 
religious concepts. 
We tested our predictions across three studies. In a first study we relied on secondary data 
to demonstrate that self-reported religious identity and participation in religious practices 
predicts U.S. state level averages of credit card debt. The strength of the first study is that we 
rely on real-world data. Unfortunately, secondary data often does not allow the exclusion of 
alternative explanations. In two experimental settings, we tried to experimentally replicate the 
findings of study 1 in a more controlled setting with a focus on the underlying processes. In 
study 2 we tested whether religious primes could affect the willingness to spend money on 
moderately sinful products (getting a massage). This experiment proved that religious primes 
reduced the willingness to spend on moderately sinful behavior because of a concern with 
approval based pressures. The participants found massages desirable, but feelings such as 
guilt and shame reduced the willingness to spend money on a hedonic massage after the 
religious prime. Initially, we added a utilitarian condition in this study because we expected 
that the religious prime would only affect the willingness to spend on the hedonically framed 
massage. Surprisingly, the religious prime also urged to spend money on the utilitarian 
massage. One possible explanation could be that exposure to religiosity also activated a health 
goal, which would explain the higher willingness to spend on a back pain relieving massage. 
In study 3, we tried to replicate our findings with a more severe sin (the consumption of 
alcohol). Again, the religious prime refrained people to spend money on wine when it was 
hedonically framed, albeit for a different reason. This time the reduced willingness to spend 
was mediated by an intrinsic devaluation of the product. Exposure to religious concepts does 
not only evoke a concern with approval based pressures, it can also hamper the intrinsic 
desirability of a major sinful product. We conclude that how religion affects impulsive 
purchase behavior is contingent upon the moral classification of the product at hand. 
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Moderate sins are monitored by a concern with approval based pressured. More severe sins 
are no longer desirable after being exposed to religious concepts. 
The current findings contribute to the literature on religion and impulsive purchase 
behavior. Prior research did consider their connection, but never gave empirical proof of any 
causal mechanism. We advance knowledge on this topic by demonstrating a causal influence 
of religion on impulsive purchase behavior. Unscrambling sentences that contained religious 
words incited individuals to spend less money on hedonically tempting products. Prior 
research (Ryan, Rigby, and King 1993; Allport and Ross 1967) argued that religion can 
change behavior for different reasons or motivations. Our findings are the first to show that 
these different motivations also come into play for impulsive purchase behavior. In addition, 
we offer empirical support for McCullough and Willoughby's (2009) idea that religion can 
enforce discipline but can also affect the selection of goals and desires. We also contribute to 
Rounding et al.'s (2012) research. They demonstrated that exposure to religion offers 
willpower. We demonstrate that the willpower evoked by religion regulates impulsive buying 
tendencies. In addition, we add to their research that religion can also affect the desirability of 
a tempting product. Lastly, we contribute to literature on impulsive purchase behavior 
(Baumeister 2002; Hoch and Loewenstein 1991; Vohs and Faber 2007) by identifying 
religiosity as a potential causal determinant. 
Throughout our studies we operationalized getting a massage at a spa as minor sinful 
behavior. Drinking wine was considered as major sinful behavior. A pretest did confirm that 
the former was less sinful than the latter, but generalizations should be made carefully. We 
ran our pretest through Amazon‘s Mechanical Turk and restricted our population to U.S. 
citizens. Earlier research on drinking habits yielded that the alcohol consumption of U.S. 
citizens is amongst the lowest in the developed world (Cohen 2008). It could be that 
consuming alcohol is considered more sinful amongst the U.S. population compared to other 
countries. Different perceptions of alcohol‘s sinfulness could be related to the vague 
definition of sinful behavior. Sinful behavior is all behavior that is in conflict with religions 
norms and values (Riley 2008). In real life, the definition of sinful behavior depends on 
people‘s own subjective interpretation and also on the word of opinion leaders. Consequently, 
there should be some variance on the individual level. 
Another sample related issue is the overall religiousness of our research population. For 
study 2 and study 3 we gathered data through MTurk from U.S. citizens. A religious 
landscape survey conducted in 2008 by the Pew Research Center showed that, on average, 
83% of the U.S. citizens were religiously affiliated. Religiosity in the U.S. is much higher 
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when for instance compared to Europe (with the exception of Poland) (Andersen, Gundelach, 
and Lüchau 2008). In study 2 and study 3 we primed the respondents with a scrambled 
sentence task that contained religious words. As our research population is quite religious, it 
could be that our respondents were more easily influenced by the religious words. This 
imposes an important limitation on the generalizability of our findings. We are not able to 
make any conclusions for other, less religious populations. 
8.1 Future research directions 
Our current findings offer insights in how religion and subjective well-being are 
interconnected with each other. Religiosity has both been associated with increases and 
decreases in subjective well-being (Ryan, Rigby, and King 1993). Religions can activate a 
concern with approval based pressures, which could cause inner twists. Inner twists may arise 
because of a conflict between intrinsic wants and feelings such as guilt or shame. These 
approval based pressures prevent people from doing what they actually want. The findings of 
study 2 exemplify this. Approval based pressures lowered participants‘ willingness to spend 
money on a desired product. A potential longer term consequence of such conflict could be a 
decrease in subjective well-being and mental health. Hence, part of religions‘ negative 
influence on well-being could be attributed to religion‘s restrictive influence on pleasurable 
consumption.  
On the other hand, religion‘s positive effect on well-being could be related to religions‘ 
influence on the desirability of products. Religion helps individuals to select beneficiary goals 
and desires. For example, study 3 illustrates that exposure to religion can incite to intrinsically 
devaluate the consumption of alcohol. (Over)consumption of alcohol generally is linked to a 
decreased overall life quality (Poikolainen, Vartiainen, and Korhonen 1996). If religion 
indeed helps to prevent potentially harmful behavior, it could also have a positive impact 
(mental) health.  
The idea that the (social) control originating from religion has more than one effect on 
subjective well-being can be traced back to the original sociological ideas as developed by 
Emile Durkheim. Durkheim (1912) extensively studied the social influences of religion on the 
individual. He observed that religion can offer a positive feeling of social integration, but it 
can also be experienced stressful and stringent. Ultimately, Durkheim even ascribed suicide 
rates to such feelings of stress or anomie. Overall, future research could address how religion 
 95 
 
differently affects subjective well-being by imposing pressure to conform and/or by helping to 
select the proper goals in life. 
Apart from the influence on mental health, religion could also trigger differential longer 
term consequences for impulsive consumption retraceable to the differences between self-
regulation and self-control. Deliberatively adjusting behavior is rooted in an individual‘s self-
control or willpower, which is generally viewed as finite. As willpower is exhaustible, 
consumers will eventually fail to control their urge and will occasionally engage in impulsive 
purchase behavior in the long run. Study 2 suggests that exposure to religious concepts incited 
to deliberatively refrain from moderately sinful temptations. If the willpower to control 
(incipient) urges is depleted, it is thus very likely that consumers occasionally buy moderately 
sinful products. Exposure to religious concepts thus offers willpower to control urges, but the 
increase in willpower should be temporary as it is subject to exhaustion. This is different from 
volitional forms of behavioral regulation, which have more persistent and enduring outcomes. 
Our results further suggest that behavioral regulation for serious sinful product could be more 
enduring because religion volitionally prompts such products as less desirable (cf., study 3).  
Future research should investigate the effects of religions‘ regulation on impulsive 
consumption and subjective well-being. We already speculated about their potential 
interconnectedness, but additional empirical support is needed. Such research could 
investigate religion‘s negative effect on subjective well-being by focusing on its role in the 
conflict between inner wants and approval based pressures. Empirical research is also needed 
to test religion‘s positive effect on subjective well-being by helping to select (mental) health 
enhancing goals and desires. Besides the focus on subjective well-being, empirical research 
could also test how enduring religion‘s effects are on impulsive consumption. Is it indeed 
possible to discriminate between the longer term effects of self-regulation and self-control?   
9. CONCLUSION 
The presence of religious concepts did affect impulsive purchase behavior. Moreover, 
religiosity could activate different forms of behavioral regulation contingent upon the moral 
classification of the tempting product. In particular, we showed that individuals may refrain 
from moderately sinful impulses because of a concern with approval based pressures. The 
participants did like the product, but feelings such as shame or guilt reduced their willingness 
to spend. We also showed that exposure to religiosity urged to disregard serious sinful 
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behavior because it ceased to be desirable. By highlighting the existence of two styles of 
behavioral regulation, we contribute to the research on impulsive purchase behavior and 
religiosity. 
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CHAPTER V: CONCLUSIONS, CONTRIBUTIONS, AND FUTURE 
RESEARCH 
 
ince the emergence of systematic research on hedonic consumption in the 1980‘s 
(Hirschman and Holbrook 1982) a great deal of interesting research has been done. 
Despite the valuable insights of previous research, hedonic consumption still has some 
unresolved mysteries. In the introductory part, we argued that hedonic consumption is a 
complex phenomenon as it is sometimes hard to grasp in logical deductions. Buying hedonic 
products does not logically lead to the experience of pleasure. Pleasure is considered to be a 
side-product of consumption that emerges under the right conditions. The experience of 
pleasure is tied to the fulfillment of fantasies and desires. The realization of wishes and 
desires assumes the freedom to express them.  
The first goal of this dissertation was to investigate how important freedom and 
autonomy could be for hedonic consumption. Across all three empirical papers we 
investigated the role of autonomy and freedom for (hedonic) consumption. The first paper 
showed that the experience of autonomy in a hedonic purchase situation is likely to affect the 
perceived longevity. The second paper demonstrated that autonomy is especially relevant for 
spendthrifts when making (hedonic) purchases. In the third paper, we showed that social 
norms and values may also affect freedom of action and put a burden on hedonic 
consumption. 
The second goal was to test if all individuals respond similarly to having versus lacking 
autonomy in (hedonic) purchase situations. In the second paper, we found that tightwads as 
opposed to spendthrifts did not behave differently when having versus lacking autonomy. It 
appeared that spendthrifts believe that they are able to express their own wishes and desires in 
most situations. However, threats to personal control reduced their feelings of autonomy and 
also curtailed their spending behavior. When lacking autonomy, spendthrifts‘ spending 
behavior no longer differed from tightwads‘. 
The third goal was to investigate how social norms and values interrupt feelings of 
autonomy and therefore reduce the appeal of hedonic products. In a third paper we showed 
that exposure to religion can reduce consumer‘ willingness to spend on hedonic products 
either because a concern with approval based pressures or because the product loses some of 
its intrinsic desirability. In what follows, we will first briefly repeat the most important 
S 
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findings. Afterwards, we will discuss the theoretical contributions, implications, and some 
ideas for further research.  
1. RECAPITULATION OF THE MOST IMPORTANT FINDINGS 
In the first paper we investigated how a hedonic versus utilitarian purchase motivation 
could alter the perceived longevity of a product. Traditional research argues that consumers 
try to construct information about unknown attributes by inferring it from external, 
observable, cues related to the marketing campaign (Kirmani and Rao 2000). In our first 
paper we tested if consumers also rely on internal cues (i.e., pain of paying) related to the 
purchase motivation to estimate the longevity of a product. First, we analyzed real market 
data on second hand cars. Building on the principles of mental accounting (Thaler 1985), we 
used the demand price of the cars as an indicator of a car‘s remaining life. We grouped the 
cars as hedonic or utilitarian and found that the latter devalue slower than the former. This 
suggests that utilitarian cars are expected to last longer. We hypothesized that a longer 
expected lifetime for utilitarian products could be explained by the pain of paying experienced 
at the moment of purchase. Utilitarian purchases are often obligatory acts in order to solve 
practical problems. We reasoned that this obligatory dimension reduces consumers‘ feelings 
of autonomy and therefore exacerbate pain of paying. We hypothesized that this causal 
mechanism could offer an explanation for utilitarian products‘ longer expected lifetime. In a 
second study, we found evidence for the entire explanatory mechanism. Utilitarian motivated 
shoppers experienced less autonomy, which exacerbated the pain of paying and increased the 
longevity estimates of a bike needed for commuting. In the other studies we focused on the 
separate steps of the causal mechanism. Study 3 showed that a reduction in autonomy 
increased pain of paying and therefore increased the estimated lifetime of a camera. Study 4 
demonstrated that a more painful method of payment (cash instead of credit card) increased 
the perceived longevity of a jacket. Across three studies, we replicated that pain of paying 
urges consumers to believe that a product will last longer. Our causal chain analysis 
confirmed the existence of our hypothesized process.  
In the second paper, we argued that spendthrifts exhibit a unique psychology. It appears 
that they act on the presumption of autonomy. We hypothesized that a reduction in feelings of 
autonomy by a threat to personal control could curb their willingness to spend. To test if 
threat to personal control moderates spendthrifts‘ spending behavior, we set up three studies. 
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Each study sketched a different situation in which the participants either did or did not 
experience personal control. In a first study the participants could either choose a training 
program or were assigned to one. The results of this study demonstrated our basic effect: 
spendthrifts‘ willingness to spend on a visit to the sauna dropped to similar levels as 
tightwads‘ when they were not able to control situational outcomes and to choose a training 
program. In a second study we manipulated threat to personal control by purchase context. 
Study 2 showed that spendthrifts experienced less feelings of autonomy when required to buy 
a functional bike and therefore were less willing to spend on bike accessories. In study 3 
threats to personal control were manipulated by a service that was out of stock. When 
spendthrifts could not choose the massage of their preference because it was no longer 
available, they were less willing to spend money on the other services provided by the spa. 
Study 3 lends further support for our model by offering mediation evidence. Spendthrifts‘ 
lower willingness to spend was mediated by a drop in positive, energizing feelings that are 
inherent to the experience of autonomy.  
In a third paper, we investigated how exposure to religion could interfere with the 
purchase of hedonically tempting products. Previous research has shown that religion steers 
behavior in two different ways (Ryan, Rigby, and King 1993). Religions either adjust 
behavior because of intrinsically compelling arguments or because of a fear of approval based 
pressures. In this paper we tested how these two different forms of behavioral regulation 
intervene with pleasurable consumption. In a first study we matched secondary data on 
religiosity and credit card indebtedness across the United States. Credit card debt has been 
used as a measure of impulsive purchase behavior (Wilcox, Block, and Eisenstein 2011). 
Analysis of this data yielded that the state level average credit card debt per borrower could 
be explained by the state level average religiosity. We replicated these findings in two 
experimental studies, with special attention for the underlying process. In study 2, we 
demonstrated that a religious prime (scrambled sentence task) urged the respondents to refrain 
from spending money on a hedonically framed massage. Getting a massage was pretested as 
moderately sinful. The lower willingness to spend was mediated by a concern with approval 
based pressures. In study 3, we showed that exposure to religion also urged to refrain from 
spending on major sinful products (alcohol), but for a different reason. In study 3, the lower 
willingness to spend on major sinful products was mediated by an intrinsic devaluation of the 
wine. Overall, we concluded that religion urges to refrain, but not dislike, moderately sinful 
behavior because of a concern with approval based pressures. Major sinful behavior is 
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despised after being exposed to religiosity because of an intrinsic devaluation of the product 
or service. 
The research goals that we set forward in the introduction were independently treated in 
each chapter. In addition, some comprehensive insights are possible. We aimed to investigate 
how purchase motivations alter the perception of a product. Chapter 2 (―Pleasure for a 
moment, functionality for a lifetime: the impact of autonomy on product lifetime 
expectancies‖) verified that purchase goals color a product‘s perceived longevity. Chapter 2 
further demonstrated that purchase goals affect the perception of the incurred costs. The 
incurred costs for the same product were perceived less (more) painful for when holding a 
hedonic (utilitarian) purchase goal. Furthermore, it appeared that the perception of autonomy 
was a crucial determinant for how the incurred costs were affectively interpreted. 
Interestingly, chapter 3 (―On becoming frugal: threat to personal control can make 
spendthrifts act like tightwads‖) also highlights the importance of autonomy. In this chapter 
we again demonstrated that feelings of autonomy are related to a hedonic purchase motivation 
(cf., study 2), and even showed that such feelings are an important requirement for impulsive 
purchase behavior by spendthrifts (cf., study 1 and study 3). Furthermore, the fourth chapter 
also stresses the importance of autonomy for hedonic purchase. Religious norms and values 
can limit people‘s sense of freedom as individuals may feel obligated to follow certain 
religious rules instead of doing what they want. Indeed, in the fourth chapter we showed that 
exposure to religiosity curtailed the consumption of hedonically tempting products. Overall, 
in our three papers we show that autonomy is important for hedonic consumption and is even 
intrinsically related to it. Lacking autonomy does not only cause more pain of paying, it also 
inhibits consumers to spend money. Hirschman and Holbrook (1982) argue that pleasure is a 
byproduct derived from consumption and is contingent upon the mental imageries created 
round a product. Our research adds that subjective autonomy and freedom are essential 
preconditions to be able to experience pleasure. 
2. THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS 
Some important theoretical contributions emerged throughout this dissertation. Each paper 
yields important contributions, combining them offers a more comprehensive insight on 
hedonic versus utilitarian consumption. Our first paper (―Pleasure for a moment, functionality 
for a lifetime: the impact of autonomy on product lifetime expectancies‖) contributes to three 
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streams of literature. First we contribute to the research on information asymmetry (Kirmani 
and Rao 2000). Everybody gets confronted with problems of information asymmetry and this 
occurs in a variety of settings. Up to now, research generally assumed that problems of 
information asymmetry are solved by inferring information from external signals. External 
signals exist in many forms and can be manipulated in different ways by marketing 
campaigns. We contribute to this field of research by showing that consumers do not only rely 
on external cues to construe information. We show that purchase motivations can activate 
certain affective reactions that may serve as an internal cue that colors the perception and 
attribute level information of a product. Instead of only relying on external cues, consumers 
also rely on internal cues related to the purchase motivation to construct product related 
information. 
Second, this paper contributes to research on hedonic versus utilitarian purchase goals. 
Prior research argues that hedonic consumption is transient and frivolous because people 
more easily adapt to pleasurable things (i.e., hedonic treadmill effect: Frederick and 
Loewenstein 1999; Wang, Novemsky, and Dhar 2009) and because hedonic consumption is 
more susceptible to fashion trends (Grewal, Mehta, and Kardes 2004). We offer an alternative 
explanation for these previous findings by linking the estimated longevity of a product with 
(the absence of) autonomy and the resulting (negative) affective reactions that arise during a 
purchase.  
Thirdly, we contribute to research on the pain of paying. Earlier research showed that pain 
of paying differs with method of payment (Raghubir and Srivastava 2008; Raghubir and 
Srivastava 2009) and framing of the cost (Rick, Cryder, and Loewenstein 2008). Our results 
suggest that freedom or autonomy associated with method of payment could serve as an 
alternative explanation for these earlier documented effects. For example, credit cards 
decouple the transfer of money from payment (Raghubir and Srivastava 2008) but could also 
offer more freedom and autonomy which may reduce the pain associated with payments. 
The findings of the second chapter (―On becoming frugal: threat to personal control can 
make spendthrifts act like tightwads‖) lend to important contributions for three different 
streams of literature. First, we contribute to literature on individual differences in spending 
behavior by introducing threat to personal control as a new moderator. When spendthrifts 
experience a threat to personal control, their spending drops and they paradoxically become 
tightwads. Secondly, earlier research mainly focused on how tightwads could be encouraged 
to spend by reducing the pain of paying (Rick, Cryder, and Loewenstein 2008; Raghubir and 
Srivastava 2008; Raghubir and Srivastava 2009). We show the mirror pattern. Spending 
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differences between tightwads and spendthrifts could also disappear by the latter spending 
less instead of the former spending more. Thirdly, we contribute to the research on autonomy 
(Leotti, Iyengar, and Ochsner 2010; Mineka and Hendersen 1985; Ryan and Deci 2006; 
Shapiro, Schwartz, and Astin 1996). Earlier research showed the positive consequences of 
autonomy. We acknowledge these findings, but nuance the overall positive impact of 
autonomy. Spendthrifts like autonomy, but it triggers them to (over)spend which is not always 
a good thing. 
The paper ―How God determines what we buy‖ investigated how religious‘ norms and 
values intervene with pleasurable consumption. Prior research documented a negative 
correlation between general measures of religiosity and impulsive behavior (e.g., Benda and 
Corwyn 1997; Gorsuch 1995; Lee 2002; Meier 2003) but did never establish a causal link. 
We contribute to these earlier findings that exposure to religion can urge to refrain from 
impulsive spending behavior for two different reasons. First, religiosity hampers the 
consumption of moderately sinful behavior because of a concern with approval based 
pressures. Second, exposure to religiosity could also obstruct the consumption of major sinful 
products due to an intrinsic devaluation of the tempting product. We are the first to establish a 
causal link between religiosity and impulsive purchase behavior. Consequently, we contribute 
to research on religiosity (Friese and Wänke 2014; McCollough 2010; Rounding et al. 2012; 
Ryan, Rigby, and King 1993) and impulsive purchase behavior (Vohs and Faber 2007; 
Baumeister 2002; Haws, Bearden, and Nenkov 2011). 
When taking all findings together, the current research yields several contributions to the 
field of hedonic consumption. Across the different papers, it becomes clear how important 
feelings of autonomy are for hedonic consumption. Botti and McGill (2011) already 
demonstrated that hedonic (but not utilitarian) activities are evaluated better when consumers 
are able choose the activity themselves instead of it being externally determined. We further 
stress the importance of autonomy for hedonic consumption by showing that it may be a pre-
condition to have pleasure. When autonomy is hampered, either by threats to personal control 
or social norms and values, hedonic consumption becomes less attractive. We also showed 
that a lack of autonomy may even activate compensatory thinking in order to cope with this 
negative situation (e.g., prolonged longevity for products bought under a lack of control). 
Autonomy and freedom appears to be intrinsically related to hedonic consumption. Yet when 
making this conclusion, one must bear in mind that too much freedom (of choice) has earlier 
been associated with negative consequences. Freedom of choice enables variety seeking 
behavior (Ratner, Kahn, and Kahneman 1999), offers choice flexibility and allows consumers 
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to match their preferences (Chernev 2003). Nevertheless, too much freedom of choice can be 
frustrating due to a (cognitive) overload which leads to dissatisfaction (Schwartz 2004) and 
even deferral of choice (Iyengar and Lepper 2000). Consequently, the adagio ―everything in 
moderation‖ seems to apply. Freedom of choice and autonomy are important under the right 
conditions, for the proper individuals.  
3. PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS 
In addition to our theoretical implications, the current results also lend to some 
downstream practical implications. Firstly, the results of the first paper offer important 
insights for the sale of extended service contracts and insurances. Extended service contracts 
(ESC‘s) are additional warranties that ensure a working product for a given period of time. As 
such, ESC‘s are sold as a practical, instrumental product. Rationally speaking, the purchase of 
ESC‘s should reflect a cost versus benefit comparisons. Nevertheless, the high profitability of 
ESC‘s suggests that they are often useless from a rational point of view (Week 2005). Our 
results showed that affective reactions (i.e., pain of paying) may also be determinative for the 
purchase of ESC‘s. As the pain of paying influences the estimated longevity of a product, 
consumers might think that it is no longer needed to buy ESC‘s. Despite its functional 
character, our results would also predict that consumers are more likely to purchase ESC‘s for 
hedonic instead of utilitarian products. Utilitarian products cause more pain of paying, which 
increases longevity estimates. Interestingly, such predictions are in line with previous 
research documenting a higher willingness to purchase ESC‘s for hedonic products (Chen, 
Kalra, and Sun 2009).  
Our second paper lends practical guidance for compulsive spenders and sellers. 
Spendthrifts are mostly immune for the pain of paying. Very often, they spend more than they 
actually have. Our results showed that spendthrifts especially spend money when they 
experience feelings of autonomy. These findings are important for both sellers and 
spendthrifts. First, if sellers want to increase their sales, it is clear that they should offer more 
autonomy and freedom to their customers. They could do this easily by increasing the size of 
their assortment and offering freedom of choice. Second, a more socially correct advice for 
spendthrifts is also possible. As autonomy triggers spending behavior, spendthrifts should 
avoid situations and places that offer autonomy and freedom of spending. If spendthrifts‘ 
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spending behavior is really problematic, the ultimate advice would be to externally limit their 
freedom of action.  
The third paper suggests that practitioners and marketers should also consider the overall 
religiosity of a targeted population when promoting pleasurable products. It appeared that 
people were less willing to buy pleasurable products when religiousness was salient. 
Interestingly, we showed that stressing the functional attributes of a hedonic product did not 
lower the willingness to buy upon exposure to religiosity. One practical advice could thus be 
to rely on such a strategy, i.e., stressing the functional value of a hedonic product, when 
promoting hedonic products in a religious population.  
In fact, the hedonic versus utilitarian framing of a product showed to be important in all 
the papers of this dissertation. In all three papers we manipulated the hedonic versus 
utilitarian distinction by changing the motivation and framing of the same product. In the 
introduction, we argued that products have the potential to activate mental imageries. In 
several of our studies we demonstrated that these mental imageries are important to 
understand how a product is perceived and to comprehend purchase intentions. This is also 
important for practitioners. Practitioners should be aware of what the consequences are of 
certain product framings. When a product is framed as hedonic or utilitarian it might activate 
a whole range of different assumptions related to that framing. From a social-psychological 
view, the framing of a product could activate schemas. A schema is a cognitive framework 
that facilitates the processing of information (DiMaggio 1997). Such cognitive shortcuts ease 
the interpretation of information, but also activate some expectations. Marketers should be 
aware of the activated expectations and should try to meet them. For instance, when a product 
is framed as utilitarian consumers may expect that it is going to last for a significant period of 
time. Likewise, when products are framed as hedonic consumers may anticipate a purchase 
context characterized by freedom and autonomy (e.g., larger assortments).  
4. LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
In our first paper, we consistently found that pain of paying increases the expected 
longevity of a product. However, the relation between purchase motivation and pain of paying 
may be less univocal. We reasoned that hedonic purchases reflect people‘s wishes and 
desires. Spending money on desires should not be painful as it enables to reach intrinsically 
valued goals. The idea that hedonic consumption reflects intrinsically valued desires is also 
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reflected in our manipulations. However, this simplification could be more complex in real 
life. In real life, spending money on hedonic products is sometimes problematic. Most people 
do not have unlimited amount of resources to spend. When having a limited amount of 
resources to spend, spending money on pleasurable things could imply the forsaking or 
postponement of other, more essential products. Such conflicts usually evoke a sense of 
guiltiness when choosing for the hedonic option. 
It is not farfetched that feeling guilty about a purchase also evokes pain of paying (cf., 
Rick, Cryder, and Loewenstein 2008). In our research, we manipulated a guilt-free hedonic 
purchase motivation. In our scenarios, purchasing the hedonic product did not imply the 
forestallment of any other product. As we did not manipulate guilt, our conclusions are only 
valid in a guilt-free context. Future research should tackle this issue by further investigating 
how longevity estimates are related to pain of paying and the experience of guilt. 
We investigated the importance of autonomy for spendthrifts. Previous research showed 
that feelings of autonomy improve mental health (Ryan and Deci 2001; Leotti, Iyengar, and 
Ochsner 2010). Our results seem to nuance these earlier findings by suggesting that autonomy 
is not necessarily a good thing for spendthrifts. Feelings of autonomy trigger spendthrifts to 
spend money, and it is very likely that several worries result from overspending. Worries 
reduce subjective well-being. Autonomy could thus hamper spendthrifts‘ mental health 
instead of improving it. Unfortunately, we do not possess any empirical material that is able 
to support such conclusions. Still, previous research raised a similar issue (Rick et al. 2008) 
by arguing a curvilinear relationship between individual scores on the spendthrift-scale and 
subjective well-being. Rick et al. (2008) reasoned that spendthrifts‘ psychological health 
should be poor because they spend more than they actually want. Tightwads‘ psychological 
health should also be poor, because these people generally spend less than they actually want. 
No research has empirically investigated this issue, leaving a fertile field of research open. 
Future research should thus try to understand tightwads‘ and spendthrifts‘ subjective well-
being. In addition, future research should also investigate how spendthrifts deal with a 
decreased mental health. According to us, it seems reasonable that spendthrifts will try to 
elevate their happiness by spending even more. Such response would eventually lock them in 
a vicious circle of (over)spending: spending elicits worries, and these worries trigger more 
spending. 
In our second paper we studied how threats to personal control affect autonomy and 
therefore determine spending behavior. Future research could try to replicate these results by 
approaching autonomy and freedom from another perspective. Our third paper already 
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showed that social norms and values could alternatively limit freedom of action and the 
willingness to spend money. Consequently, it is likely that autonomy-reducing norms and 
values also moderate spendthrifts‘ spending behavior. In addition, future research could 
approach freedom and autonomy from an assortment size perspective. The freedom of choice 
(or the lack of it) that is associated with large versus small assortments could moderate 
spendthrifts‘ spending tendencies. It seems reasonable that spendthrifts will spend more when 
they can choose from larger assortments because large assortments offer freedom of choice 
(Chernev 2003). However, unlike other situational feelings of autonomy, consumers can 
experience too much choice in a large assortment. The experience of too much choice hinders 
spending behavior (Iyengar and Lepper 2000; Schwartz 2004). It would be interesting to 
investigate how spendthrifts versus tightwads behave in such contexts. Can an assortment 
ever be too large for spendthrifts? Do they also experience choice overload? Maybe, 
spendthrifts only experience choice overload for utilitarian products? Answering these 
questions is an important step in order to understand spendthrifts‘ spending psychology and 
should therefore be addressed in future research. 
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